Journal of Air Transportation, Volume 7, No. 3 by Kabashkin, Igor & Bowen, Brent D.
University of Nebraska at Omaha Aviation Institute
ISSN: 1544-6980
Library of Congress: HE9761.1.J68
About the Journal of Air Transportation
THE JOURNAL
The Journal of Air Transportation (JAT)
mission is to provide the global community 
immediate key resource information in all 
areas of air transportation. Our goal is to be 
recognized as the preeminent scholarly 
journal in the aeronautical aspects of 
transportation. As an international and 
interdisciplinary journal, the JAT provides a 
forum for peer-reviewed articles in all areas 
of aviation and space transportation 
research, policy, theory, case study, practice, 
and issues. While maintaining a broad 
scope, a key focal point of the journal is in 










University of Nebraska at Omaha Aviation Institute
ISSN: 1544-6980
Library of Congress: HE9761.1.J68
Development
The JAT was conceptualized to fulfill an international void of scholarly publications in this
area as identified by the primary organizers. It is envisioned that aviation leaders will utilize the
JAT as a key decision-making tool. Scholarly rigor and standards will be uncompromised with
regular evaluation by the Editorial Board and Panel of Reviewers.
Return
Exit
University of Nebraska at Omaha Aviation Institute
ISSN: 1544-6980
Library of Congress: HE9761.1.J68
Scope
The JAT will accept manuscripts on all topics that relate to air transportation, both technical
and non-technical. The Panel of Reviewers represents the interdisciplinary nature of air
transportation to ensure review by recognized experts. Broad categories of appropriate topics
include, but are not limited to:
•Aviation Administration, Management, Economics, Education, Policy, Engineering, Technology,
and Science
• Intermodal Transportation
• Aerospace Education and Flight
• Airports and Air Traffic Control
• Air Transportation Systems: Domestic, International, Comparative
• Aviation/Aerospace Psychology, Human Factors, Safety, and Human Resources
• Avionics, Computing, and Simulation
• Space Transportation Safety, Communication, and the Future




University of Nebraska at Omaha Aviation Institute
ISSN: 1544-6980
Library of Congress: HE9761.1.J68
Dissemination
The JAT is catalogued at key research libraries world wide, including the U.S. Library of
Congress. It is also indexed in Aviation Tradescan, EBSCO On-line, the National Research
Council TRIS Index, and ERIC Resources in Education. In addition, the JAT is available
through interlibrary loan at the University of Nebraska at Omaha Library and the Transport and
Telecommunications Institute in Latvia via accessing the global OCLC inter-library loan network.
A permanent archive is maintained at the University of Nebraska at Omaha. Annual subscriptions
are available for U.S. $35 for individuals and U.S. $68 for institutions. For subscriptions outside




University of Nebraska at Omaha Aviation Institute
ISSN: 1544-6980
Library of Congress: HE9761.1.J68
Organizations
Host Organizations:
University of Nebraska at Omaha (UNO) - Nancy Belck, Chancellor; Derek Hodgson, Vice-
Chancellor for Academic Affairs.
Co-Sponsor Organizations:
American Society for Public Administration - Transportation Section - Jeremy Plant, Chair,
Transportation Section
Air Transport Research Society - Tae Oum, Chair
NASA Kansas Space Grant Consortium - David Downing, Director
NASA Nebraska Space Grant Consortium - Brent Bowen, Director
NASA Space Grant and Fellowship Program, Aerospace Working Group – Diane DeTroye, Interim
Program Director
Transport and Telecommunications Institute, Latvia - Eugenye Kopitov, Rector
World Aerospace Education Organization - Kamal Naguib, Chairman
Supporting Organizations:
Aviation Institute, UNO - Brent Bowen, Director
Center for Public Affairs Research, UNO - Jerome Deichert, Director
College of Public Affairs and Community Service, UNO - B.J. Reed, Dean
School of Public Administration, UNO - Russell Smith, Chair
University Library, UNO - Janice Boyer, Dean
Return Exit
University of Nebraska at Omaha Aviation Institute
ISSN: 1544-6980
Library of Congress: HE9761.1.J68
Editors
Brent D. Bowen
Dr. Brent Bowen is Director and Distinguished Professor, Aviation Institute, School of Public Administration, University of Nebraska at 
Omaha, and the University’s Director of Aviation and Transportation Policy and Research. Bowen attained his doctorate in Higher 
Education and Aviation from Oklahoma State University and a Master of Business Administration degree from Oklahoma City University. 
His Federal Aviation Administration certifications include Airline Transport Pilot, Certified Flight Instructor (Gold Seal), Advanced 
Instrument Ground Instructor, Aviation Safety Counselor, and Aerospace Education Counselor. Dr. Bowen’s research on the development of 
the national Airline Quality Rating is regularly featured in numerous national and international media, as well as refereed academic
publications. Dr. Bowen has in excess of 250 publications, papers, and program appearances to his credit. His research interests focus on 
aviation applications of public productivity enhancement and marketing in the areas of service quality evaluation, forecasting, and student 
recruitment/retention in collegiate aviation programs. He is also well published in areas related to effective teaching and has pioneered new 
pedagogical techniques. Dr. Bowen has been recognized with awards of achievement and commendation from the American Marketing
Association, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Federal Aviation Administration, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, 
W. Frank Barton School of Business, Travel and Transportation Research Association, World Aerospace Education Association, and others.
Igor Kabashkin
Dr. Igor Kabashkin is Vice Rector of the Transport and Telecommunications Institute, Latvia, and a Professor in the Aviation Maintenance 
Department and member of the Technical Committee on Transport of the European Commission for Cooperation in the Field of Scientific 
and Technical Research. Kabashkin received his Doctor Degree in Aviation from Moscow Civil Engineering Institute, a High Doctor 
Degree in Aviation from Moscow Aviation Institute, and a Doctor Habilitus Degree in Engineering from Riga Aviation University and 
Latvian Academy of Science. His research interests include analysis and modeling of complex technical systems, information technology 
applications, reliability of technical systems, radio and telecommunication systems, and information and quality control systems. Dr. 
Kabashkin has published over 274 scientific papers, 19 scientific and teaching books, and holds 67 patents and certificates of invention.
Return Exit
University of Nebraska at Omaha Aviation Institute
ISSN: 1544-6980
Library of Congress: HE9761.1.J68
JAT Personnel
Editor: Brent Bowen, Aviation Institute, UNO
Co-Editor: Igor Kabashkin, Transport and Telecommunications Institute, Latvia
Former Managing Editor: Nanette Scarpellini-Metz, Aviation Institute, UNO
Managing Editor: Jocelyn Nickerson, Aviation Institute, UNO
Manager, Technology-Based Educational Systems: Scott Vlasek, Aviation Institute, UNO
Library Liaisons/Advisors: John Reidelbach, University Library, UNO
Publications Specialists: Joyce Carson, Layout; Melanie Kiper, Copy Editor, Center for




University of Nebraska at Omaha Aviation Institute
ISSN: 1544-6980
Library of Congress: HE9761.1.J68
Editorial Board
Membership on the JAT Editorial Board is by invitation and approval of the board. This appointment should be viewed as professional recognition of significant 
career achievement and high academic/industry distinction. Applicants will generally be senior faculty members (graduate faculty standing where applicable), or 
persons who have attained substantial industry or public service achievement in the case of practitioner members. Term of appointment is three years with opportunity 
to request renewal. For membership consideration, submit a curriculum vita or industry resume and statement of interest to: Dr. Brent Bowen, Executive Editor.
Members:
R. I. R. Abeyratne -- ICAO Air Transport Bureau, Canada
Ballard Barker -- Florida Institute of Technology
Brent Bowen -- University of Nebraska at Omaha
Tim Brady -- Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
Thomas Carney -- Purdue University
Larry Carstenson -- University of Nebraska at Kearney
Thomas Connolly -- Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
Nader A. Dahabi -- Ministry of Transport, Jordan
E. Julius Dasch -- NASA, Washington, D.C.
David Downing -- Kansas Space Grant Consortium University of Kansas
Gerry Fairbairn -- Daniel Webster College
John Fitzpatrick -- College of Aeronautics
Triant Flouris – Auburn University
Atef Ghobrial -- Georgia State University
Sveinn Gudmundsson -- Toulouse Business School, France
Vishwa Bandhu Gupta -- Bandhu Aerospace Pvt., Ltd., India
M. M. Hamed -- Jordan University of Science and Technology, Jordan
Dean Headley -- Wichita State University
Momdauh Muhammed Heshmat -- Egyptian Civil Aviation Authority, Egypt
William Hiscock -- Montana Space Grant Consortium Montana State University
Lofti Kaabi -- Institute Regional des Sciences Informatiques et des Telecommunications, Tunisia
Igor Kabashkin -- Transport and Telecommunications Institute, Latvia
Gary Kiteley -- Council on Aviation Accreditation
Hart Langer -- United Airlines
Mike Lavelle -- The Boeing Company
Henry Lehrer -- Rossford, Ohio
Keith Mason -- Cranfield University, England
Robert Matthews -- FAA, Washington, D.C.
H. C. McClure -- Mac Air Consulting
Graeme McDowal -- Air New Zealand, New Zealand
Frank Mitchell -- University of Oklahoma
Phillip Moore -- Hong Kong Institute of Technology, China
Kamal Naguib -- World Aerospace Education Organization, Egypt
Isaac Nettey -- Kent State University
David NewMyer -- Southern Illinois University
Gary Northam -- Parks College of Engineering and Aviation; Saint Louis 
University
Tae Oum -- University of British Columbia, Canada
Korham Oyman -- Anadolu University, Turkey
Kent Penney -- Nebraska Department of Aeronautics
Aisling Reynolds-Feighan -- University College, Ireland
William Shea -- SHEA Aviation Associates
N. Thomas Stephens -- Florida Institute of Technology
Scott Tarry -- University of Nebraska at Omaha
Abdul Wahab Teffaha -- Arab Air Carriers Organization, Lebanon
Alexander Wells -- Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
Kenneth Wiggins -- Oklahoma State University
Return Exit
University of Nebraska at Omaha Aviation Institute
ISSN: 1544-6980
Library of Congress: HE9761.1.J68
Panel of Reviewers
John M. C. King -- Aviation & Tourism Management, Australia
Valery Kutev -- Transport and Telecommunications Institute, Latvia
Mike Larson -- University of Nebraska at Omaha
Thomas Lawton -- Imperial College, University of London, England
Kyung-Sup Lee -- Transportation & Logistics Institute, Korea
Chien-Tsung Lu -- Central  Missouri State University
Jacqueline Luedtke -- Daniel Webster College
Rebecca Lutte -- The Woodlands, Texas
William McCurry -- Arizona State University
J. Patrick McKinzie -- Minnesota State University
Juan Merkt -- Ohio University
A. Keith Mew -- California State University–Los Angeles
Terry Michmerhuizen -- Duncan Aviation
Boris Misnevs -- Transport and Telecommunications Institute, Latvia
Massoum Moussavi --University of Nebraska–Lincoln
Y. S. Park -- Korean Air, Korea
Manoj Patankar -- San Jose State University
Michael Pearson -- Arizona State University
Anthony Perl -- CUNY Aviation Institute at York College
Stephen Quilty -- Bowling Green State University
Thomas Reilly -- Safety Harbor, Florida
Dawna Rhoades -- Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
Robert Ripley -- Auburn University
Ryan Rogers -- Southern Illinois University, Carbondale
Jose Ruiz -- Southern Illinois University, Carbondale
Stephen Rutner -- Georgia Southern University
Respicio A. Espírito Santos, Jr. -- Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
Michael Schukert -- Palm Coast, FL
Mary Sandy -- Old Dominion University—Virginia Space Grant
Michaela Schaaf -- University of Nebraska at Omaha
Kim Jeffrey Stevens -- Aeronautics Division of ADOT
Vadim Stroitlev -- Air Navigation Service, Latvia
Yoshinon Suzuki -- Iowa State University
Mary Ann Turney -- Arizona State University
Victor Ujimoto -- University of Guelph, Canada
Bijan Vasigh -- Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
Timothy Vowles Victoria – University of Wellington, New Zealand
Elizabeth Ward -- NASA Langley Research Center
Thomas Weitzel -- Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
David Widauf -- Utah State University
Marc Wilson -- AMES Consulting, Inc.
Irina Yatskir -- Transport and Telecommunications Institute, Latvia
Malcolm Yeo -- Edith Cowan University, Australia
Jule Zumwalt -- World Aerospace Education Organization
International Members
Ahmed Abdelghany -- United Airlines
Densel Acheson -- University of Nebraska at Omaha
Anthony Adamski-- Eastern Michigan University
Julio Aguilar -- Solvciones en Regulaciones y Mercados,Mexico
Fariba Alamdari -- Cranfield University, England
Herbert Armstrong -- College of Aeronautics
Andreas Antoniou -- Commonwealth Secretariat, England
Kenneth Barnard -- Kansas State University
Jon Bryan -- Bridgewater State College
Gerald Chubb -- The Ohio State University
David Conway -- Southeastern Oklahoma State University
Gerald Cook -- Spirit Airlines
Milford Coor -- International Aviation Law Consultant
James Crehan -- South Dakota State University
Khalid Durani -- Karachi, Pakistan
Steve Erb -- U.S. Department of Transportation
Jay Evans -- National Business Aircraft Association
E. Terence Foster -- University of Nebraska–Lincoln
Terry Gibbs -- University of Nebraska at Kearney
Mavis Green -- Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
Allen Hamilton -- Federal Express
Fred Hansen -- Oklahoma State University
William Herrick -- Middle Tennessee State University
Jos Heyman -- Tiros Space Information, Australia
John Horine -- Central Missouri State University
Matteo Ignaccolo -- University of Catania, Italy
Sajjad Jasimuddin -- King Abdulaziz University, Saudi Arabia
Randy Johnson -- Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
Alexander Kalmykov -- The SABRE Group, Texas
Craig Kanske -- Sky Views, Oklahoma
Reviewers are appointed by the Editor to represent all elements of aviation
and space transportation scholarship and practice. An appointment to the Panel
of Reviewers recognizes professional and academic achievement. Appointments
are for a three-year term with the option of renewal. For membership consideration,
submit a curriculum vita or industry resumé to Dr. Brent Bowen, Executive Editor.
Return Exit
University of Nebraska at Omaha Aviation Institute
ISSN: 1544-6980
Library of Congress: HE9761.1.J68
Volume 7 Number 3
Sorenson Best Paper Award Recipient
Ethics Education in University Aviation Management Programs in the US: Part One—The Need
The Relationship Between Fidelity and Learning in Aviation Training and Assessment
Search and Rescue Operations of Aircraft in Africa: Compelling Issues
Strategic Classification and Examination of the Development of Current Airline Alliance Activities
Book Review – Air Transport Networks-Theory and Policy Implications
Return Exit
Sorenson Best Paper Award Recipient
ETHICS EDUCATION IN UNIVERSITY AVIATION






This three-part study examines how four-year universities in the United States with
baccalaureate programs in aviation management include ethics instruction in their
curricula. Based on a literature review, no research exists to describe the current status
of teaching ethics to aviation students. Yet concurrently, unethical activities reported
in the media involving the aviation industry indicates a need for such programs. Part
One of this study justifies the need for ethics education and develops a series of
hypotheses to evaluate the current status of ethics instruction, which was investigated
and will be reported on in Parts Two and Three of this study, respectively
INTRODUCTION
Stories about the unethical behavior of individuals in our society appear
regularly on the front page of newspapers and on evening news broadcasts.
In career area after career area, ethical lapses shake the confidence of the
public, whether it is disreputable corporate business dealings, political
scandals, medical malpractice, legal corruption, or improper relationships
between personnel in the nation’s military services. In fact, in 1997, the
Ethics Officer Association reported that nearly half of the nation’s workers
had engaged in some sort of unethical or illegal acts during the previous
year (Nearly half, 1997).
The aviation industry has its own share of problems in this regard;
examples of unethical conduct in individuals and organizations abound.
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For instance, a mechanic in a large regional airline claimed he found
evidence of sabotage in the form of cut wires on an aircraft brake system.
However, investigators later discovered the mechanic had cut the wires
himself in an effort to get a fellow employee fired (Chicago mechanic
charged, 1997). In another case, the U.S. Department of Transportation’s
Office of Inspector General (1998) charged a large American air cargo
carrier with parting out parts from two Boeing 727 aircraft. The carrier had
purchased two 727s from a foreign air carrier and falsified the records to
show that the aircraft had been maintained according to U.S. airworthiness
standards. Then the company sold parts of the aircraft as if they had been
receiving regular airworthiness inspections and servicing. All of the
equipment transfer tags, which accompanied the parts, were fraudulently
marked to show the parts in serviceable condition, and many of these parts
were critical assemblies to be used on other aircraft. The collusion existing
among the company’s high-ranking management personnel necessary to
accomplish all this is especially noteworthy.
Generally, in corporate America the principal motivation to act
unethically is selfish interest such as competitive advantage, higher
revenue, or individual advancement, and the results usually appear in the
loss of something of dollar value to competitors or customers.
Unfortunately, the consequences of unethical conduct in the aviation world
sometimes extend beyond things to which a dollar value can be assigned.
Often it results in lost lives.
Perhaps one of the most noteworthy incidents of this in recent history
took place in the Florida Everglades in May 1996 and involved a Valujet
Airlines accident in which 110 passengers and aircrew members died.
Most people heard the press reports about some oxygen-generating
canisters causing an on-board fire shortly after takeoff, which eventually
raged out of control before the pilots could safely return to land in Miami.
What most people do not understand is that the accident could have been
prevented altogether if certain personnel involved had acted ethically.
Through a complex chain of events the oxygen canisters were illegally put
on board the ill-fated aircraft for shipment. In violation of maintenance
checklists, the canisters had not been properly prepared for shipment by
contracted maintenance facility personnel when originally removed from
other aircraft. Nevertheless, the mechanics and supervisory personnel
involved certified the work as though it had been done! In the official
accident report the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB, 1997)
said,
The Safety Board is alarmed at the apparent willingness of mechanics and
inspectors at the SabreTech facility to sign off on work cards indicating that
the maintenance task had been completed, knowing that the required safety
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caps had not been installed, and at the willingness of those individuals and
other maintenance personnel (including supervisors) to ignore the fact that the
required safety caps had not been installed. The Safety Board has long been
concerned about false maintenance entries, and their sometimes catastrophic
implications. (p. 116)
Later in the report the NTSB said, “It is very likely that had safety caps
been installed, the generators would not have activated and the accident
would not have occurred [italics added]” (p. 135).
General Statement of the Problem
The obvious question at this point is what can be done to correct
situations such as the ones cited above. Referring to similar events, Pelikan
(1992) said that poor ethical conduct on the part of university graduates
reflects poorly on the university education those graduates received. While
serving as President of the College Board, Stewart (1988) stated that,
“schools and colleges have a crucial obligation to transmit an ethical sense
and an understanding of moral values to our young people” (p. 11). Bok
(1986) called for courses in “moral reasoning and the analysis of ethical
dilemmas in both undergraduate and professional school curricula”
(p. 172). Indeed, a growing number of higher education academic fields
have initiated ethics instruction as part of their curricula. Most prominent in
this author’s search were the fields of law, medicine, business
administration, and public administration; some other disciplines have
begun to explore this arena as well.
Though it would be nearly impossible to measure the effect of ethics
education in the subsequent professional lives of university graduates,
many people from a wide variety of positions are calling for ethics to be
part of collegiate curricula (Bok, 1986; Pelikan, 1992; Stewart, 1988). As
will be discussed later, it appears that several preliminary conclusions can
be drawn about the programs that so far have established instruction on
ethics as a part of a student’s education. Those programs that are making
the most progress in incorporating ethics education are characterized by
support for the inclusion of this subject from the administrators of those
programs (Brody, 1989; Piper, Gentile, & Parks, 1993; Rhode, 1995).
College faculty and staff in programs that have infused ethics as a pervasive
part of their curricula (i.e., as an integral facet of the curriculum, not merely
as an adjunct course taught as a separate subject unrelated to a student’s
major) report this approach to be more successful in accomplishing
program goals than previous ethics instruction programs (Bundy, 1995;
Link, 1989; Spaeth, Perry, & Wachs, 1996; Strike, 1990). Closely related
to the previous points, programs that successfully adopt ethics into their
curricula involve many of the department’s faculty members in teaching
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and modeling ethics across the spectrum of course offerings in the
department (Hafferty & Franks, 1994; Menkel-Meadows & Sander, 1996;
Piper et al.; Spaeth et al.).
After an extensive search of the literature to date, this author has found
that no one has addressed the subject of bringing ethics into the aviation
management curriculum. Yet, it should be quickly apparent from reading
professional aviation literature that ethical problems exist within the
aviation industry, one that is a highly technical industry with a high
percentage of college graduates in its ranks. Such graduates are filling
management positions at all levels in the commercial airline industry, the
aerospace manufacturing industry, federal aviation organizations, the
airport management industry, corporate aviation departments, and a host of
other organizations that daily affect the lives of millions of people. It stands
to reason that a strong ethical value system accompanied by impeccable
behavior should be required of individuals with such responsibilities. So as
a first step in pursuing the inclusion of ethics in aviation administration
curricula, it would be wise to ascertain the state of the current situation in
such departments in the United States pertaining to ethics education for
aviation students.
Research Questions
The purpose of this three-part study is to examine university
departments, which offer baccalaureate degrees with aviation management
(or its equivalent) as an academic major, in order to describe the current
state of ethics education within those departments. The study will be
accomplished in three parts. First, ethics will be defined, ethics education
will be justified, and a series of hypotheses will be developed to guide
research into the status of ethics education in the aviation education arena.
Second, using a survey instrument, answers to the following major
questions will be sought:
1. Are aviation administration departments requiring the teaching of
ethics as an intentional part of their curriculum?
2. If ethics is a planned part of the curriculum, how is it taught and who
is teaching it? For example, is it: (a) an adjunct course or courses
taught by someone from outside the department, (b) a course or
courses taught by someone from within the department, (c) a subject
taught by intentionally integrating ethics into many courses within
the department, or (d) some combination of all the above?
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3. Is there a relationship between the importance that the department
head places on ethics and whether the department incorporates ethics
into its curriculum?
4. Is there a relationship between the ethical perceptions of the
department head and whether the department incorporates ethics into
its curriculum?
A third phase of the study will follow the initial statistical analysis of the
responses to the survey. Individual interviews will be done to discover and
describe why ethics is being taught or not taught. If ethics is being taught,
follow-up questions to be answered will deal with how to best accomplish
the objective of teaching the subject to collegiate aviation management
students. If ethics is not being taught, follow-up questions will deal with
reasons for not doing so. The results of Parts Two and Three of this study
will be reported in separate papers.
Review of the Literature
The following literature review will begin with some definitions and
cautions to guide the discussion of the subject of ethics. Then the idea of
justification of ethics instruction will be raised. In so doing, the author will
describe some theoretical information regarding ethical decision-making
and moral judgment, and he will follow with empirical research based on
these theoretical constructs. Based on this justification for ethics education,
the author will describe the efforts to establish such programs in several
academic fields in higher education. These efforts will be summarized with
the intent of guiding the research outlined above for Parts Two and Three of
this study. Before actually going on to Parts Two and Three, it will be
necessary also to review several concepts dealing with the subject of
educational change and how that process occurs.
Some Definitions and Cautions
Prior to discussing ethics education, it is important to begin with a few
definitions concerning the term ethics and to raise a few cautions about any
study that enters this realm. The Oxford English Dictionary (Michaelis,
1989) defines ethics as “the science of morals; the department of study
concerned with the principles of human duty” (p. 421). The Standard
College Dictionary (Simpson, 1963) states ethics is “the study and
philosophy of human conduct, with emphasis on the determination of right
and wrong” (p. 455). Strike (1988) continues in this vein by saying, “ethical
issues concern questions of right and wrong-our duties and obligations, our
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rights and responsibilities” (p. 156). In sum, ethics deals with standards of
conduct.
Having arrived at a standard of conduct by some process, one then must
go one step further. Ethics and morals are closely related. Ethics tell you
what the standards are—what you ought to do or what you should do.
Morals deal with the application of ethical standards to actual conduct.
Morals reveal what you actually do. Because of the close relationship, it is
very difficult to talk about one without discussing the other, particularly
when talking about an actual issue. In fact, many would say it serves no
purpose to have standards unless those standards influence behavior. And
conversely, it makes little sense to talk about right and wrong conduct
without basing the discussion on some set of standards.
Several other terms are frequently used in discussing this area: moral
issue, moral agent, ethical decision, and unethical decision. Jones (1991)
has given the following definitions:
A moral issue is present where a person’s actions, when freely performed, may
harm or benefit others…A moral agent is a person who makes a moral
decision…An ethical decision is defined as a decision that is both legal and
morally acceptable to the larger community…An unethical decision is either
illegal or morally unacceptable to the larger community. (p. 367)
Even in reading the terms just defined, one can see they are loaded with
subjectivity, and consequently, with controversy. For instance, who decides
whether an issue harms or benefits others and what degree of harm or
benefit is needed to fit the definition? If an ethical decision is defined as one
that is acceptable to the larger community, who is this community that
decides what is acceptable, and how much is larger? Thus, a few cautions
are needed before proceeding further.
First, ethics is an emotionally charged issue. Some larger issues in the
field of ethics appear to be black and white; however, most fall in the realm
of gray. For example, most people, if asked, would support the ethical
standard that it is wrong to kill another person. However, as soon as some
actual circumstances are considered, the question is no longer so cut-and-
dried. Thus, individuals in American society have vigorously debated
related subjects like capital punishment, euthanasia, infanticide, abortion,
war crimes, and crimes against humanity without reaching much consensus
on the ethical standards involved on any of them. Although laws may have
been passed or judgments rendered, debate continues. The question still
rages regarding who will set the standards for what is and is not ethical. In
many instances, this is the very crux of the issue itself. In this respect, this
study will not address how departments or professors should teach
particular ethical issues. This paper will be aimed at addressing whether the
subject is included within a curriculum. Actual course content and
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objectives and specific course pedagogy are subjects for follow-up studies
after an initial survey of the academic field is completed.
A second caution deals with terminology. Many people use the terms
ethics and morals interchangeably as though they are synonymous. As
mentioned above, in the clearest sense they have slightly differing
meanings. Ethics deal with the standards of behavior, while morals deal
with actual conduct. Some authors have not made this distinction in their
writing and direct quotes will reflect this; however, this author will try to
maintain the difference when using these words.
Justifications for Ethics Education
Justification for incorporating ethics into college curricula is the first
critical issue that needs to be discussed. Merely showing that unethical
behavior problems exist does not necessarily demonstrate that ethics
instruction at the university level is needed to correct a societal trend.
Therefore, the most important place to begin is to see if any previous
theory-based or empirical studies have been published which give some
justification for including the subject at all in higher education coursework.
In short, the big question is simply whether instruction in ethics can bring
about changes in ethical judgment, and thus affect moral conduct as well.
The first justification for teaching ethics comes from simple logic—you
teach ethics whether or not you formally teach ethics. Piper et al. (1993)
described a five-year project which began in 1987 to bring ethics to an
already intense curriculum at the Harvard Business School. The authors
begin by speaking to skeptics who would say you can not teach ethics to
postgraduate students:. They state, “What faculty are silent about and what
they omit send a powerful signal to students” (p. 6). Rhode (1995) said,
“Faculty who decline, explicitly or implicitly, to address ethical issues
encourage future practitioners to do the same…. The most important
characteristic of effective professional responsibility programs [ethics] is
the message that the subject is itself important” (p. 140-141).
If nothing is said about the subject of ethics, a subtle, but dynamic
message has been transmitted that ethics is not important enough to be
considered in this curriculum. And if it is not important enough to be in this
curriculum, it is also not important enough to be considered in the career to
follow. Saying nothing about the subject because one is convinced it will
have no impact whatsoever is prejudging students who enroll in college
degree programs. A simple illustration of this principle is that some people
will drink and drive and kill themselves and others in the process; however,
that does not mean legislators should revoke the laws regarding drinking
and driving and that others should abandon all efforts to educate the public
on this issue. So it is with ethics.
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A typical objection is that it is too late to give university students ethics
education because they have already formed their moral standards based on
their developmental years, and it is not possible to change their thinking. A
related argument against ethics education is that the classroom is an
artificial world and, thus, it is useless to discuss ethic in the classroom
because things will change in the real world with all of its situational
pressures. To answer these objections subjectively, a number of authors
(Menkel-Meadow & Sander, 1995; Menzel, 1997; Rhode, 1995) stated that
students enjoy discussing ethical issues when presented in an interesting
way. Empirically, Rhode pointed to studies that demonstrate that people in
early adulthood do make significant changes in how they deal with moral
issues. Also, in a survey of 234 Masters of Public Administration alumni,
75 percent said they had faced a work-related ethical dilemma, and about
70 percent of them said their ethics education helped them respond to the
situation (Menzel, 1997). Additional empirical evidence follows as a
second reason to teach ethics.
A second justification for teaching ethics comes from evidence of the
effectiveness of teaching the subject matter. Although the number of
publications dealing with empirical evidence for the effectiveness of ethics
education is far less than the number dealing with the theoretical and
pedagogical aspects of teaching the subject, some empirical evidence does
exist for teaching ethics (Rest & Thoma, 1986). The ideal situation would
be that researchers establish an experiment in which they randomly select
two groups of students and give them some kind of pretest to establish their
ethical level before treatment. Then they have half of the students take a
curriculum with no ethics education while the other half takes the identical
curriculum except that it includes ethics education. Finally, they would
look at the groups some time later and compare their ethical conduct on the
job, and they would try to draw conclusions about the impact of ethics
education. Needless to say, this idealized scenario would be nearly
impossible to conduct with any degree of validity.
A major limitation, therefore, of empirical studies to determine the
success of ethics education in the form of changed behavior is that they
simply do not exist. Brody (1989) said, “Our program, like most others, has
not engaged in any formal evaluation process, in large measure because we
have not yet been able to define how such a process would work” (p. 717).
Ales, Charlson, Williams-Russo, and Allegrante (1992) stated, “Most
faculty concurred that it was not possible to measure the immediate impact
of the [ethics] course on students’ abilities to think about ethical issues”
(p. 407).
However despite the limitations, some work has been done to determine
the effect of ethics education. To understand it, two concepts need
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explanation: ethical decision-making and moral development. There are
models on the process that individuals follow when working through a
specific scenario requiring an ethical decision. Such models outline a step-
by-step process going from recognition of an issue as one that is an ethical
one (or that has ethical implications) to the actual action resulting from a
decision on the issue. Fraedrich and Guerts (1990) call for an
understanding of this concept as an essential part of ethics education.
There are also views on what has been called moral development theory.
Models have been devised which describe how an individual develops his
or her reasoning ability to make decisions on ethical issues. For ease of
discussion, the author will refer to models, views, perspectives, or
constructs in these areas as those dealing with (a) the ethical decision-
making process and (b) developing moral judgment.
The ethical decision-making process. Rest, Bebeau, and Volker (1986)
developed a model of ethical decision-making and behavior called the Four-
Component Model (see Figure 1), which has been referenced in literature
dealing with how individuals choose ethical courses of action (Jones, 1991).
Although more complex models exist to describe this concept, particularly
when considering individuals in organizational settings, the Four-Component
Model is sufficient to understand the empirical evidence for teaching ethics. In
the first step of this model an individual recognizes a decision-making situation
as one that involves an ethical issue. Next, the individual makes an ethical
judgment; that is, he or she decides what the ethically correct course of action
should be. Third, the individual establishes moral intent. This means that
knowing the correct course of action and the competing influences, the
individual decides mentally to follow the ethical course of action. Finally, the
person must actually perform what is ethically required in the given situation.
This step in the process is the place where ethics becomes morals.
Although this model seems rather simple and straightforward, it begs
answers to a number of questions. For Step 1, for example, it questions how
an individual comes to recognize issues as ones involving ethics.
Regarding Step 2, it questions how individuals decide what is the ethical
course of action. For the last steps, it questions how a person develop the
Oderman 11
Recognize Make Moral Establish Moral Engage in Moral
Moral Issue Judgment Intent Behavior
Figure 1. The Four-Component Model. The four steps used to make moral decisions.
willpower to mentally decide to do what is right and then actually do it in
the face of competing courses of action. A model on developing moral
judgment answers some of these questions.
Developing moral judgment. For over thirty years a highly referenced
model dealing with moral development is the one proposed by Kohlberg (Jones,
1991; Kohlberg & Turiel, 1971; Petrick, 1992; Trevino, 1986). In it Kohlberg
describes six stages of moral development which address the questions raised in
the preceding paragraph about the first two steps of the Four-Component
Model. Kohlberg and Turiel stated that people develop progressively through
the stages as they mature morally, and that the “stages have been validated by
longitudinal and cross-cultural study” (p. 416). Individuals develop morally
from middle childhood to adulthood through three levels, each made up of two
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STAGE WHAT IS CONSIDERED RIGHT
LEVEL 1 - PRECONVENTIONAL
Stage One - The punishment and
obedience orientation.
The physical consequences of action determine
its goodness or badness regardless of the human
meaning or value of these consequences.
Stage Two - The instrumental
relativist orientation.
Right action consists of that which
instrumentally satisfies one’s own needs and
occasionally the needs of others.
LEVEL 2 - CONVENTIONAL
Stage Three - The interpersonal
concordance or “good boy - nice
girl” orientation.
Good behavior is that which pleases or helps
others and is approved by them.
Stage Four - The law and order
orientation.
There is orientation toward authority, fixed
rules, and the maintenance of the social order.
LEVEL 3 - PRINCIPLED
Stage Five - The social-contract
legalistic orientation.
Right action tends to be defined in terms of
general individual rights and in terms of
standards which have been critically examined
and agreed upon by the whole society.
Stage Six - The universal ethical
principle orientation.
Right is defined by the decision of conscience in
accord with self-chosen ethical principles
appealing to logical comprehensiveness,
universality, and consistency.
Table 1. Kohlberg’s Model of Cognitive Moral Development
stages. These levels and stages are tabulated in Table 1 using excerpts from
Kohlberg and Turiel.
As can be seen, people at Level One operate from self-interest so as to
avoid punishment or to promote self-benefit, thus reminding one of
childhood motives for acting in certain ways when instructed by adults.
Those in Level Two (which according to Kohlberg includes most of
American adults) conform to the expectations of good behavior of society
or some smaller segment of society. Only at Level Three (less than 20% of
American adults) do individuals act in accordance with universal ethical
principles. “Persons at a higher level of moral development not only reason
better, but they act in accordance with their judgments” (Kohlberg & Turiel,
1971, p. 414).
Kohlberg’s research along with that of others (e.g., Trevino, 1986)
indicates that individuals make ethical decisions from the particular stage
of moral development that they have reached regardless of the ethical
dimensions of the circumstances surrounding the decision. That is, they get
to the second step of the Four-Component Model regardless of the
circumstances surrounding the decision. However, linkage between
thought processes and actual actions, that is, going to the third and fourth
steps of the Four-Component Model, is more problematic (Trevino). The
research of other authors in this area has shown that individual conduct will
vary as the issues change and as external influences come into play (Couch,
Hoffman, & Lamont, 1995; Ferrell & Gresham, 1985; Jones, 1991).
Empirical linkage. The Kohlberg Model and the Four-Component Model
intersect at the first two steps of the Four-Component Model. Rest and Thoma
(1986) reviewed research to evaluate the effects of educational programs and
interventions designed to promote the development of moral judgment.
Specifically, they did a meta-analysis of 55 studies, which had all used the
Defining Issues Test (DIT) to assess the impact of moral education programs on
moral judgment development. They drew six conclusions from their review, of
which four apply to the topic of this study and are listed below:
1. Moral education programs emphasizing dilemma discussion (peer
discussion of ethical dilemmas with the teacher as the discussion
leader) and those emphasizing personality development (programs
that promote reflection about self and about self in relation to others)
both produce modest but definite effects, with the dilemma
discussion method having a slight edge.
2. Academic courses in the humanities and social studies (courses in
which the emphasis is placed on learning some body of academic
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knowledge) do not seem to have an impact on moral judgment
development.
3. Programs with adults (24 years and older) seemed to produce larger
effect sizes than programs for younger subjects; however, several
artifactual explanations may account for this trend.
4. Interventions longer than 12 weeks have no more impact than
interventions of 3-12 weeks; however, durations less than three
weeks tend to be ineffective when measuring moral judgment by the
DIT. (p. 85-86)
The authors admitted that taking the conclusions of this study regarding
improved moral judgment to the third and fourth steps of the Four-
Component Model, that is, improvements in moral behavior, would be
extremely difficult. Nevertheless, they “would expect there to be at least
some modest correlation between moral judgment and behavior” (p. 87).
However, Kohlberg and Turiel (1971) stated, “Experiments demonstrate
that principled persons act more honestly and live up to their beliefs in the
face of inconvenience and authority more so than do people or children at
lower stages” (p. 414). Thus, a second justification for incorporating ethics
instruction into higher education curricula is that teaching ethics can
improve moral judgment.
Efforts to Incorporate Ethics Instruction in College Curricula
There have been efforts within several academic disciplines to
incorporate ethics instruction as part of their curricula. Before seeking to
describe the current state of affairs within the aviation management major,
it would be important to have an understanding of the efforts that have been
made by others to date. Particularly important to note would be such things
as what they have done, what factors have enhanced such plans, why they
have proceeded the way they have, what problems they have encountered
along the way, and how they have responded to those problems.
Law schools. One would expect that law schools had been teaching ethics
since the beginning as it would appear that ethics is an integral part of a law
curriculum; however, such is not the case. In fact, it has only been since the mid-
1970s that the American Bar Association has required law schools to provide
ethics instruction for their programs to be accredited (Rhode, 1995). Simply
incorporating a required ethics course, however, created many problems. As
Metzloff and Wilkins (1996) stated,
The litany of problems associated with that course is widely accepted.
Required since the mid-1970s, the course on ethics has been an unwanted
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stepchild in many institutions. In most schools, it was the only or one of the
few required courses; its mandatory nature breeds resentment among students.
(p. 2)
One law school that did have more success instituting their ethics
curriculum was the University of Notre Dame. In 1974 the Notre Dame
faculty adopted a mission statement that included the dual objectives of
teaching substantive and procedural issues and of “sensitizing our students
and other scholars to the many ethical dilemmas that lawyers and clients
face” (Link, 1989, p. 485). Rather than just teaching a required course on
the subject, the faculty decided to utilize a pervasive method to teach ethics,
that is, they wanted all faculty members to address ethics in all courses as
appropriate to the subject matter of the courses.
The Notre Dame program still includes a required first-year ethics
course. Their reasoning for doing so is important to understand:
The ethics course is taught at the beginning of the first semester because the
faculty wants to catch the students while they are still unspoiled, while they
still have a high level of idealism. More important, we believe that the ethical
focus creates an ambience that will strongly affect their law school career as
well as their eventual professional decision making. (Link, 1989, p. 489)
The first-year course lays the foundation, and the inclusion of ethics in
the balance of the curriculum infuses ethics into the rest of the coursework.
A third year applied ethics course summarizes everything in the law school
program.
While other law schools had problems with their ethics instruction,
Notre Dame proceeded with an effective program. There are several
reasons for their success. First, it was based on a mission statement adopted
by the faculty. Second, they sought and received confirming advice from
the dean of another respected law school. Finally, they had as a faculty
member one of the “leading legal ethics scholars in the country” (Link,
1989, p. 485).
Gradually, other renowned law schools began to address the issue. In
1987 the University of Pennsylvania Law School established its Center on
Professionalism. Spaeth et al. (1995) discussed what motivated this
university to take action:
While the leaders of the profession proclaim its fundamental virtue, and while
teaching and writing about legal ethics flourish, reprehensible behavior even
among the most acclaimed lawyers persists. It is our earnest conviction that
this situation will not change unless the law schools accept some
responsibility for teaching the profession’s ideals not only to law students but
to practicing lawyers and judges. (p. 154)
The University of Pennsylvania had taught the required course as an
upper level course. By self-admission, it was “if not a disaster, close to it”
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(Spaeth et al., 1995, p. 154). Not only did students not like the course, but
professors also tried to avoid teaching it. Professors did not seek tenure by
doing research in the area. They disliked preaching on the subject. They did
not like teaching a subject in which they had little practical experience.
Thus, the Center on Professionalism was created to instruct a vital subject
area while overcoming the myriad problems associated with ethics
instruction. The model they used was the pervasive method with a
creatively taught required course at the beginning of the curriculum and a
series of modules subsequently taught throughout the remaining portion of
law school (Spaeth et al.).
In analyzing their developmental process several key elements stand out.
First, the Center saw the need to develop materials that faculty could use so
they would not flounder in the classroom. Second, to do this they convened
advisory committees consisting of practicing lawyers, teachers, judges, and
non-lawyers to create practical scenarios for use in discussing essential
points. As a result, the cases that the committee developed had very
practical application directed to the future careers of the students. Third,
after development of the materials, they were all test-taught, and a teacher’s
guide was written to enable all professors to teach the coursework even if
they had not participated in the materials development. Spaeth et al. (1995)
summarized their thoughts as follows:
In our view, if the effort is to succeed, it must be the result of an informal but
self-conscious partnership of the bench, bar, and academy. But the academy,
we believe, should take the lead, for it has resources of time for reflection and
scholarship, and it can bring a searching objectivity to the task, beyond the
resources of the bench and bar. (p. 172)
The stimulus for other law schools to seriously think about the way they
included ethics in their curricula came with a large monetary grant. In
December 1990, the W. M. Keck Foundation began its Law and Legal
Administration Grant Program. Between 1991 and 1995 the Keck
Foundation granted about $5 million in 23 gifts to schools for the principal
purpose of improving ethics education methodology. It is very interesting
that Metzloff and Wilkins (1995) termed this effort in the early 1990s as an
“important commitment to an area of law that was admittedly still in the
developmental stage [italics added]” (p. 1). In November 1995, deans and
legal scholars from sixty law schools gathered at Duke University to share
lessons learned. A synopsis of those lessons follows.
Rhode (1995) described how Stanford Law School instituted the
pervasive approach to teaching ethics. She cited several important
considerations in establishing such a program. “Effective programs
generally require a strong institutional commitment to the subject, together
with well-structured course materials and methods for evaluating student
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performance” (p. 141). She stated that it was because of encouragement
from the school’s dean in conjunction with the Keck grant that more faculty
members subscribed to the effort. Once initiated, an ongoing improvement
plan has been critically important as well. Stanford now distributes
annotated bibliographies with good teaching materials to aid professors in
teaching the subject.
Initiating this approach at Stanford has not been without problems.
Needless to say, the pervasive approach only works if professors concur
with it. If professors are unwilling to discuss the issue or treat it seriously,
students quickly adopt similar attitudes. Thus, poor or soured treatment of
the subject could be worse than no treatment at all. Stanford overcomes this
by allowing professors to opt out of being part of pervasive ethics although
few have chosen to do so. To help in this area, Rhode (1995) said that
choice of instructional materials is important.
Faculty at UCLA utilized the Keck grant to develop a pervasive
approach also. According to Menkel-Meadow and Sander (1996), faculty
members interested in legal ethics formed a working group, and within that
group they developed a series of teaching problems. The working group
meetings became weekly seminars for professors to experiment with
various teaching methods. In essence the working group atmosphere along
with the projects undertaken in the group gave faculty the foundation they
needed to build their own expertise to the point where they believed they
could adequately address the subject in relation to the courses they taught.
Bundy (1995) reported the same effect on faculty at the University of
California at Berkeley Law School. “A clear benefit of the Keck Project…is
the very considerable integration of ethics into the academic lives of our
faculty” (Menkel-Meadow & Sander, p. 134).
The UCLA faculty drew several conclusions from their initial efforts to
infuse the curriculum with ethics. First, the pervasive approach must not
just rely on a little bit of ethics in a lot of courses; there must be a course
(best taught in the first year) which includes the foundational concepts and
structures of ethics. Bundy (1995) confirmed this point as well from the
perspective of the California-Berkeley experience. Second, if more faculty
members include ethics in their courses, then the overall effect will be
greater. In other words synergy is at work with increased breadth and depth
of ethics coverage. Third, it is wise to continue the working group
meetings, but “structured leadership and funding help to make these
sessions more timely, better organized, and better staffed” (Menkel-
Meadow & Sander, 1996, p. 137). Finally, Menkel-Meadow and Sander
cited the need for continued leadership and funding from outside academia
since the higher education community is “somewhat resistant to change”
(p. 138).
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Medical schools. Just as one would expect the legal profession to have had
ethics instruction in its higher education curricula for quite some time, one
would also expect the medical profession to have had the same due to the
integral nature of medical practice with certain ethical issues. Indeed, one hears
of the Hippocratic Oath and assumes medical students have discussed its
implications for centuries. However, most medical schools in the United States
did not have ethics in their curricula until the 1970s (Gillon, 1996). Thus, just as
law schools have begun fairly recently to incorporate ethics instruction, the
same is true for medical schools. And just as some law schools have made
notable advances, so have some medical schools.
In July 1983, with the support of a grant from the DeCamp Foundation, a
conference was held at Dartmouth College on the subject of including
medical ethics in medical school curricula (Culver et al. 1985; Gillon,
1996). In a report of that conference, Culver et al. (authors from eight
different medical schools) summarized the state of affairs for the medical
school community at that time.
Formal teaching of ethics in the medical school curriculum has increased
greatly during the past 15 years. Yet, schools vary in how much attention they
give the subject, and even those that do offer courses vary considerably in the
form and content of their curricula…. A medical school dean or curriculum
committee surveying the current state of education in medical ethics might
conclude that nothing has evolved that might serve as a national standard for
adequate instruction. They might also conclude that courses in ethics are fine
so long as one or more interested faculty members want to teach them, but that
no deeper institutional commitment needs to be made and that no additional
resources need to be devoted to the teaching program. (p. 253)
Culver et al. concluded “that the field is now sufficiently developed and the
need for the application of ethical knowledge and skills in medicine
sufficiently compelling to justify a recommendation that all medical
schools require basic instruction in the subject” (p. 253). Going further,
Culver et al. suggested several key aspects to such a program, which have
also been supported by Weatherall (1995) of the medical school at Oxford
University. Teaching of the subject should be interdisciplinary, meaning
that clinicians and ethicists, who usually do not have training in each
other’s fields, should cooperatively teach the subject of medical ethics. The
authors outlined what could be called a pervasive method for teaching
ethics in a medical school program-required course(s) in the pre-clinical
years devoted to ethics and small-group discussion of ethics during the
clinical years (especially as applied to specific cases on which medical
students are working). In this regard they recommended that ethical
consultation be available at teaching hospitals. Finally, they stated that to
be effective, ethics instruction must be “rigorous and precise…taught
unapologetically…challenging…and measured” (p. 253). To this list
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Weatherall added one more essential characteristic. Leadership for
instituting and continuing such a program must reside in one person or
department of the school so that responsibility for the program is grounded.
Although ethical issues permeate the practice of medicine, the debate as
to whether ethics instruction should be a formal part of medical education
is not cut and dried. Hafferty and Franks (1994) presented three conflicting
perspectives on this issue, which really summarize the thoughts of most
authors across the whole spectrum of educational specialties:
First…past ills in the practice of medicine and the conduct of science can be
corrected and future ills avoided only if ethics instruction is accorded a greater
formal presence in the medical school curriculum …. Second…while it may
be possible to teach the knowledge base of, or information about
ethics…one’s moral character basically is established prior to entry into
medical school and…course materials or even an entire curriculum will not
decisively reshape a student’s personality or ensure ethical conduct in the
future…. Third…while one’s ethical posture is most deeply shaped by long-
standing personal and family values and beliefs, if it is to be influenced by
current work and training environments the most influential vehicle involves
informal processes such as “general clinical experience,” peer interactions,
“ward rounds,” and “role models” rather than formal course work in ethics or
related topics. (p. 862)
Hafferty and Franks (1994) challenged all three perspectives and say
that ethics should not be regarded as a body of knowledge and skills to be
used as the situation arises, but rather ethics should be framed as a part of
the future physician’s professional identity. They proposed several parts to
a curriculum. Although formal instruction by itself is not sufficient, it
should be done early and continued through the student’s tenure in the
program. More important is the hidden curriculum that students receive via
socialization—“the processes by which people acquire the values and
attitudes, the interests, skills, and knowledge—in short, the
culture—current in the groups of which they are, or seek to become a
member” (p. 865). In other words, formal instruction is important, but even
more important is the modeling of ethics by faculty during all aspects of
medical training.
Brody (1989) described a program started in the early 1980s to teach
medical ethics at Baylor University. Although they offer formal courses as
electives for first-year students, the major effort at Baylor is through
required case conferences during clinical rotations. The Baylor staff
considers three ingredients as crucial in using this method. First,
“conferences must be scheduled regularly” (p. 715). Since the conferences
deal with real patients, students get an understanding of how ethical issues
are handled in real life. Second, “the conferences must focus on the review
of cases…that have troubled the students” (p. 716). Third, enough time
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must be allocated to adequately talk about the problems raised. The Baylor
staff has found it essential to have the active support of the department
chairperson in order to make this effort a success.
Ales et al. (1992) reported on the development of a required medical
ethics course at Cornell University Medical College. The Cornell course
was designed by faculty consensus, that is, 15 physicians from a variety of
medical specialty areas met to develop a case-based course which would be
taught to second-year students prior to beginning clinical clerkships. The
idea was to provide them with a basis “to think critically and systematically
about ethical issues faced by practicing physicians” (p. 406). Cases were
developed for each medical specialty, and students were given the cases and
relevant readings to prepare ahead of time. A six-step method was
presented in the course to help students organize their thinking on the cases.
Groups of 10 to 15 students would then meet with a faculty expert to
discuss the cases. Open and candid discussion contributed to the course
receiving high marks for satisfaction on post-course student evaluations.
Business administration schools. Addressing the issue of teaching ethics
in business administration schools began in the late 1950s with the publishing of
books which encouraged education beyond just vocational training (Gilbert,
1992). Buchholz surveyed initial efforts to do this in 1979 (Fraedrich & Guerts,
1990). This study of business school deans and faculty found that most believed
the subject to be important and recommended that courses in values be required.
A follow-up study to this initial survey was done in 1987, and the results showed
that a third of business schools had a special course in their curriculum that dealt
primarily with ethical issues in business. In 1988 the Ethics Resource Center
completed another follow-up study which showed that three quarters of the
responding schools included ethics somewhere in their curricula (Fraedrich &
Guerts, 1990; Gilbert, 1992; McNair & Milam, 1993).
To answer the question of why teach business ethics, Gilbert (1992)
pointed to a number of previous works which “conclude that awareness of
and clear practical thinking about moral issues in business do not happen
spontaneously; hence the need to teach business ethics in business schools”
(p. 6). Although ethics has been traditionally taught as theory in philosophy
departments, he stressed the need for the subject to be taught with practical
application to business in mind and that it should be taught by one with a
mastery of philosophical writings as well as familiarity with business. He
recommended teaching the subject early in the curriculum so principles
could be applied to all functional courses. Fraedrich and Guerts (1990)
discussed a number of existing problems with teaching ethics; however,
they recommended using a series of constructs in a course on ethics to
enable students to understand ethical decision-making. Using such
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constructs will help them understand how they can bring ethics into the
business setting.
Not surprisingly, since Bok (1986) advocated ethics education while
president of Harvard, the Harvard Business School has led the way in
establishing such a program. Piper et al. (1993) described a five-year
project which began in 1987 to bring ethics to an already intense
curriculum at Harvard. Harvard designated a core group of professors to
develop the curriculum. After looking at three options (a required course,
elective courses, or distribution of ethical topics across existing courses),
they decided all three should make up an integrated curriculum. Harvard
requires an introductory course of all first-year students, and the focus is to
discuss the issue up front to insure it is recognized as a key concept to be
dealt with throughout the student’s entire tenure in the program. In
addition, by design, each professor addresses applicable ethical principles
in all of the other courses taught, and electives are available for those
interested. Integrating all three course options capitalizes on the strengths
of each option while minimizing the weaknesses of any one separately.
However, curriculum does not make the program successful by itself.
Piper et al. (1993) pointed to three primary reasons for the successful
implementation of the ethics program at Harvard. First, it had the support of
the leadership of the university and the business school. Second, it had the
support of the school faculty. Third, Harvard pursued faculty training and
development. In summing up the Harvard experience, Piper et al. stated,
The evidence is clear: our students are not the problem. Almost all of them are
eager to talk about purpose and principle, to explore the systemic causes and
consequences of unethical behavior, to study outstanding leaders and
organizations as they grapple with ethical dilemmas…. The problem rests
with the failure of education to encourage and assist students in their search
for purpose and worth. (pp. 148-149)
When discussing Harvard’s program to incorporate ethics into their
curriculum, another factor should be added as a contributor to its
establishment. In 1987 Harvard Business School received a gift of $20
million from former Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman, John
Shad, to bring ethics education into the curriculum, and alumni contributed
another $10 million to this effort (Bryne, 1992). This enabled the faculty to
devote time and effort to the task of developing courses and 35 case studies
used in the program. Jones (1989) said that Harvard’s prestige among
business schools has led to other schools adopting or considering similar
actions, and he pointed to MIT and Georgia Tech as specific examples.
Within the business administration discipline, McNair and Milam
(1993) conducted a more focused survey of over 200 faculty members in
the accounting field on the subject of ethics education as related to
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accounting. The study revealed several important conclusions. First, they
found that nearly 70 percent of the survey participants thought there was a
need for more coverage of ethics even though over 77 percent of the
respondents said they already gave some course time to the subject. The
authors thought this was a first step to improvement. Additionally,
“communication between faculty and administrators could serve to
stimulate interest further” (McNair & Milam, 1993, p. 801).
McNair and Milam (1993) documented some problems needing
resolution. The highest-ranking obstacle according to faculty members
surveyed is time—time to include ethics in the curriculum. Second, more
materials need to be developed although some professional accounting
organizations and companies have produced cases and videos. Third,
faculty members need training in the proper method of using cases in the
classroom. To resolve these problems, the authors recommend one key
ingredient—administrative interest. The survey indicated that only 35
percent of the schools’ hierarchies encouraged including ethics in
accounting coursework. Over 95 percent of the participants said there was
little reward for incorporating ethics into courses. “This lack of
encouragement from administrators and failure to include [it] in the reward
structure are two additional areas that can be addressed” (p. 806).
Public administration schools. Closely related to business administration
is public administration, and such schools have also been involved in the effort
to institute ethics in their curricula. According to Hejka-Ekins (1988) and
Menzel (1997), the increasing prevalence of political scandals beginning with
Watergate has focused attention on the issue of ethics education within the
public administration field. A series of surveys done among schools accredited
by the National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration
(NASPAA) tracked an interesting trend. A 1978 study showed that 43.3 percent
of NASPAA schools offered an ethics course. In 1980 this figure stood at 21.1
percent. A 1986 survey by Hejka-Ekins (1988) showed that 31.4 percent of
NASPAA schools were teaching ethics, and this statistic led her to state, “It
seems reasonable to say that the development of a separate course in
administrative ethics has remained a low priority among NASPAA schools over
the last decade” (p. 886). In this study Hejka-Ekins used a questionnaire to
initiate further contact with faculty members in those schools that offered an
ethics course, and she found that “most courses had been incorporated into the
curriculum…due to the persistent efforts of one or more individuals who were
able to convince the faculty of the need” (p. 886).
Since that study, NASPAA “incorporated language into its curriculum
standards that called for public administration programs to ‘enhance the
student’s values, knowledge, and skills to act ethically and effectively’” in
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the late 1980s (Menzel, 1997, p. 224). Since then, many additional public
administration schools adopted ethics courses into their curricula, and as
previously reported in this paper; it appears that the courses are having an
impact on graduates.
Other academic disciplines. Authors from other academic disciplines
have made important, but isolated, contributions to the literature on the subject
of teaching ethics (e.g., Allegretti & Frederick, 1995, and McMinn, 1988 in the
area of psychology; Bivins, 1993 in journalism; McCaleb & Dean, 1987 in
communication; Patterson & Vitello, 1993 in health education; and Stotsky,
1992 in English composition). They concurred that ethics instruction should be
an important part of the curriculum; however, most of their work is aimed at
curricular objectives or pedagogy for particular courses rather than at broader
issues of incorporating ethics into a whole curriculum.
Concerning departments or schools of education, Strike (1990), who has
written rather extensively on the subject of ethics instruction within the
higher education community, is one of the few who proposes a deliberate,
planned school-wide ethics curriculum. He established the need for such by
describing education as a profession, and as such, it must be “capable of
sustained ethical behavior apart from extensive external monitoring”
(p. 47). He added that “ethical conduct is thought to be largely a product of
training. The norms and standards of the profession are supposed to be
internalized during formal education of the professional” (p. 47).
An essential aspect of Strike’s (1990) position is that ethics must be part
of the entire curriculum. “The crucial thing about instruction in
professional ethics is that it permeate the curriculum for practitioners. If it
does not, those unfortunate enough to have to teach courses in professional
ethics will be voices crying in the wilderness” (p. 52). He made several
recommendations about such a curriculum for training educators in the area
of professional ethics. First, “some values and moral concepts…will be
internal to subject matter and are best acquired in the process of learning
subject matter…. Second, there may be moral concepts that are implicit in
what students learn in teacher education courses” (p. 51). In other words,
dealing with ethical problems in education should be discussed to some
degree during courses such as pedagogy and educational psychology.
Finally, “there is a significant role for direct instruction in professional
ethics” (p. 52).
Synopsis of lessons from non-aviation curricular areas. At this point, it
is useful to summarize some key points that are common to the research done by
all the academic schools above in order to draw together the lessons learned
from these efforts to establish ethics as an essential part of higher education
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curricula. These lessons serve as the foundation of hypotheses for further
analysis concerning current efforts to incorporate ethics instruction in aviation
management curricula.
Lesson 1. Many people and organizations from a cross-section of
society in general, professional organizations, and academia are calling for
ethics to be part of college curricula. The reasons vary; nevertheless, the
opposite viewpoint that ethics should not be taught is rarely, if ever, raised
and supported by writers on this subject. Hypothesis: people in the aviation
community believe that ethics should be part of college aviation
administration curricula, and few people voice the opposite opinion.
Lesson 2. The faculty members and administrators most closely
associated with programs that have attempted to incorporate ethics in their
curricula conclude that support from higher levels of a college’s
administration is an important factor in the success of the undertaking.
Support can be most readily seen in resources for faculty training and
materials production and in openly awarding recognition to those involved
with the curricular development of the program. Hypothesis: those aviation
programs that have already included ethics in their curricula are more likely
to have higher-level administrative support for doing so as seen in resources
for ethics instruction and in recognition of those involved with it.
Lesson 3. Even in the absence of higher-level support, leadership from
the department head can result in an effective ethics education component
in the curriculum. Additionally, the enthusiastic efforts of one professor or
a very small group of faculty members has led to the initiation of viable
ethics instruction at some colleges and universities. Hypothesis: those
aviation departments that already have ethics as part of their curriculum are
more likely to have department head support for it or at least one aviation
professor who has led efforts to include ethics in the curricula.
Lesson 4. Multiple authors across disciplines conclude that ethics is best
taught by the pervasive method. The pervasive method means that ethics is
a required part of the curriculum, and it appears in all related coursework
not just as an adjunct that is taught as separate subject matter unrelated to
the other coursework required for the degree. When ethics is best included
in an academic program, it is not just an introductory course taught from
outside the department. Hypothesis: those aviation departments that do the
best job of including ethics in their curricula are those that use the pervasive
method.
Lesson 5. Closely related to the above points is that the whole faculty
should be involved in the teaching and modeling of ethics across the
spectrum of course offerings; it should not just be relegated to one or two
specialists outside, or even within, the department. Faculty members
internal to specific departments would be more comfortable and more
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effective in teaching ethics if they have received some training in this field.
Hypothesis: those aviation management departments that desire to do the
best job of incorporating ethics in their curricula are more likely to have
many faculty members teach the subject internally and are more likely to
provide training to their faculty to accomplish this.
Lesson 6. A number of individual universities and/or academic
disciplines have received impetus to begin a program of ethics instruction
from sources outside the university organization. Specifically, outside
grants have provided monetary resources to get started, and academic
accrediting agencies have provided impetus by requiring ethics-related
goals in order to achieve accreditation. The involvement of practitioners
from related industries or professions has proven to be a good support
network in several fields in the form of help in course material
development. Hypothesis: those aviation programs that already incorporate
ethics in their curricula are more likely to have been influenced by outside
agencies in the form of supporting resources or accreditation requirements.
Lesson 7. Modeling of ethical principles by faculty and staff is an
essential ingredient of any effort to teach ethics. Hypothesis: those aviation
departments that want to be most effective in their presentation of ethics
will be those in which faculty and staff members model the ethical
principles they are teaching.
Lesson 8. Besides lack of higher-level administrative support, the key
obstacles to incorporating ethics are lack of time for ethics instruction in an
already-packed curriculum, lack of good course materials, and lack of
trained faculty. Hypothesis: the principal obstacles that aviation
departments face when initiating ethics education in their curricula are lack
of time in an already-packed curriculum, lack of good course materials, and
lack of trained faculty.
A rather extensive review of the literature has failed to find any writings
on the subject of incorporating ethics instruction in higher education
programs in aviation management. Is ethics being taught in these
programs? Have faculty members and administrators already seen the need
for such instruction? What are they doing now? These questions and others
will be investigated in Parts Two and Three of this study using the summary
points and hypotheses above as a guide. However, the absence of any
writings on the subject would justify the initial thought that not much has
been done to date. Thus, it would appear that including ethics instruction in
aviation administration programs could be an instance where educational
change is needed.
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The Concept of Educational Change
As discussed above, various academic schools have initiated new
programs to incorporate ethics into their curricula. Some of the
methodology has been covered as well as discussions of hindrances, plans
of action, and important considerations necessary to make such programs
successful. In all of these cases, educational change was an underlying
concept. In each case, an individual, a group of individuals, or a whole
department saw a need to change an established curriculum to include
something new and different. Although this present study is not a study on
educational change per se, it would be very beneficial at this point to briefly
look at some theory regarding the subject as something that would inform
the present research effort. As nothing has been published about ethics
instruction in aviation management curricula, such efforts might be in their
infancy. Thus, concepts associated with educational change may provide
valuable insight into these beginning efforts.
Fullan and Stiegelbauer (1991) devised a four-step model for
educational change, which is useful in plotting the progress of such change
as it occurs. The model is shown in Figure 2. The initiation phase includes
everything done until a decision is made to change something in an
educational program. The implementation phase covers the initial efforts to
use the new changes, and usually includes the first two to three years of
experience after adoption. Continuation refers to everything done after
implementation as a new change becomes part of the routine program. The
term, outcome, describes the results of how the new change has improved
the educational program. As Fullan and Stiegelbauer indicated, this is a
simplified model. Often changes bounce back and forth between phases as
additional changes to the original changes are initiated to improve the
program even further.
The ethics instruction programs just described above fall into the Fullan
and Stiegelbauer model somewhere. Since the first phase is probably the
most crucial in educational change (i.e., if one can not get past this stage,
one will never get any further), it is useful to look at this phase briefly. The
incorporation of ethics in an educational curriculum must begin here. If it
can not get past the hurdles of phase one, ethics will never become part of
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Initiation Implementation Continuation Outcome
Figure 2. A simplified overview of the change process. The four steps involved in changing
educational programs.
the curriculum. If someone or some department can initiate the project in
the first place, then according to the success stories referenced above, such
a program stands a more favorable chance of successful implementation.
Factors influencing educational change. Fullan and Stiegelbauer (1991)
suggested a list of eight factors, which affect initiation of educational change.
Although they applied these eight factors to the K-12 educational environment,
seven of them can be readily applied to the higher education level as well. First,
they cited existence and quality of innovations. They stated that there is no
shortage of innovations; the question becomes one of assessing the quality of
innovations. “The lessons of the past have made people in education more
careful in taking on unproven new change programs; and limited resources
force them to be even more selective” (p. 52). Applying this to the subject of this
study, one would say that since nothing has been published on successful
adoption of ethics teaching in aviation management programs, departments
would be hesitant to initiate and fund such a change to their program. Ethics
instruction might be regarded as a short-term fad without long-term merit, or it
might be regarded as too expensive to initiate.
The second factor mentioned by Fullan and Stiegelbauer (1991) is “the
selectivity that occurs as a result of differential access to information”
(p. 53). In describing this, they said that some educators are less traveled
than others. For that reason they are not familiar with innovations that are
being initiated. Related to this factor, this author would add that those
educators who have spent more time in the aviation industry would
probably have encountered more actual ethical dilemmas, and thus, would
be more aware of the ethical problems in the industry from personal
experience. This could be a motivating factor in wanting to do something
about the problem.
“Initiation of change never occurs without an advocate” (Fullan &
Stiegelbauer, 1991, p. 54). Thus, they announced the third factor, and they
identified one of the most powerful advocates as the chief administrator.
Such an administrator may be hard to identify by title at each college or
university. It may be the university president; it might be a dean; it may be
the department head. All of these could easily fill this role, but the point
remains that an individual in one of these positions can be a strong advocate
for a particular change, or that same individual can be a powerful barrier to
the change ever happening. Certainly, adoption of an ethics curriculum
would be easier if a chief administrator supports such a change.
A fourth factor influencing change is teacher advocacy (Fullan &
Stiegelbauer, 1991). Thus, individual professors who strongly endorse an
issue may unilaterally make changes in the parts of the curriculum over
which they have authority. At the higher education level, individually-
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initiated change is even more readily possible than at the K-12 level
because of academic freedom, tenure, and individual control over course
content. Thus, a professor, who sees the need for ethics instruction, can
initiate such instruction in the courses he or she teaches. If successful, this
professor could be a catalyst for incorporating ethics instruction on a wider
basis within that professor’s department.
Fullan and Stiegelbauer (1991) stated that a fifth factor affecting
initiation of change is an external change agent, any advocate for change
that is outside the academic department. For instance, many universities
offering aviation management programs have industrial advisory
committees which keep the university updated with industry trends and
needs. Such a committee could provide feedback to the university staff on
the need for graduates with some knowledge of ethical decision-making.
Another example would be a company or professional organization, which
would provide a monetary grant to initiate a program to incorporate ethics
into the curriculum.
A sixth factor is new policy and funds. On the K-12 level Fullan and
Stiegelbauer (1991) inferred that this factor encompasses federal and state
policies and funds associated with these changes. However, on the
collegiate level, this could easily refer to policies of accrediting bodies. If
such accrediting bodies required some instruction in ethics in order for
university aviation administration programs to be accredited, ethics would
have to be taught in some form. Although mandating such courses in this
manner might create initial opposition, it might also create an atmosphere
in which departments endeavored to do the best they could to successfully
incorporate ethics into their curricula.
The final factor raised by Fullan and Stiegelbauer (1991) is that schools
make decisions to adopt change from either a problem-solving or
bureaucratic orientation. Schools looking at change from the problem-
solving perspective will regard additional funds as a chance to solve local
problems and as a stimulus to improve present programs. Those looking at
change from the bureaucratic perspective regard change as a method to
receive additional resources to be used for other purposes or as a way of
receiving recognition for innovation. Summarizing the work of other
authors, Fullan and Stiegelbauer said that schools generally follow the
bureaucratic mold. Specifically, schools adopt change more readily when
innovations add resources without requiring behavioral change, ease
external pressure for change, and receive approval from “peer elites”
(p. 60). “Bureaucratically speaking, then, the political and symbolic value
of initiation of change for schools is often of greater significance than the
educational merit and the time and cost necessary for implementation
follow-through” (p. 61). What this statement means for initiation of ethics
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instruction can be summarized by simply saying that the more extensive the
curricular change, the less likely it is to receive support. A small cosmetic
change involving another department offering an ethics course to assuage
some external requirement will receive support long before an aviation
department is likely to approve a complete curricular change that involves
teaching ethics pervasively.
Synopsis of hypotheses concerning educational change. These seven
factors raised by Fullan and Stiegelbauer (1991) add a framework to guide
research on the initiation of change in any curricula. These factors were
considered in the design of this research project. It should be noted that some of
these factors overlap with and complement lessons learned from other academic
areas. This is expected since the discussion of lessons from other academic
areas was founded on educational changes in the curricula of these other subject
areas regarding their initiation of ethics instruction. The following summarized
list of hypotheses for each factor mentioned by Fullan and Stiegelbauer (1991)
serve as items for evaluation in Parts Two and Three of this study.
Factor 1. Aviation departments hesitate to initiate and fund ethics
instruction programs because little has been published on the subject within
the aviation academic community.
Factor 2. Aviation departments that currently incorporate ethics in their
curricula have department heads with greater experience in the aviation
industry.
Factor 3. Aviation management departments that currently include
ethics in their curricula tend to have department heads that support such
efforts.
Factor 4. Those aviation programs that have ethics as part of their
curricula tend to have at least one professor with a demonstrated interest in
teaching ethics.
Factor 5. Aviation departments that currently include ethics in their
undergraduate programs tend to have been influenced by organizations
outside the university in the form of requests to include ethics in the
curriculum or resources to include ethics.
Factor 6. Aviation departments that presently include ethics in the plans
of study of their students are more apt to have accreditation standards
requiring ethics to be part of their curricula than those departments without
such standards.
Factor 7. The process of initiating change to include ethics in aviation
management curricula will be slow, proceeding step-by-step rather than
going from no ethics in the curriculum to the pervasive inclusion of ethics
in a very short time span. Defining slow or short time span is arbitrary, but
as seen in the literature review such efforts to pervasively bring ethics into
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the curricula of other academic areas took several years to accomplish. The
same would be expected in aviation management curricula.
CONCLUSION
The importance of teaching ethics to aviation management students has
been demonstrated. Anecdotal evidence has been provided to show that
individuals and organizations in the aviation industry have made ethical
errors, which have led to a range of results from illegal financial gain to the
endangerment of human lives. Teaching ethics at the higher education level
is justified for two reasons. First, logic says that one teaches ethics whether
or not ethics is formally taught; saying nothing on the subject transmits a
loud message that it is not important. Second, there is empirical evidence
that ethics can be effectively taught to college students.
Since there has been nothing published on the subject of teaching ethics
in aviation management curricula, the current status of the inclusion of
ethics in such curricula is unknown. To investigate this subject more, a
preliminary review of literature was conducted to discover how other
academic curricular areas approach the matter of ethics instruction.
Additionally, the concept of educational change was studied to provide
background information on what it takes to introduce new educational
concepts into a curriculum. This literature review yielded a number of
lessons and hypotheses which can now be used as the basis for the research
done in Parts Two and Three of this study on ethics education in university
aviation management programs. The results will be documented in
subsequent reports.
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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FIDELITY AND






Flight simulators can be designed to train pilots or assess their flight performance.
Low-fidelity simulators maximize the initial learning rate of novice pilots and
minimize initial costs; whereas, expensive, high-fidelity simulators predict the real-
world in-flight performance of expert pilots (Fink & Shriver, 1978; Hays & Singer
1989; Kinkade & Wheaton, 1972). Although intuitively appealing and intellectually
convenient to generalize concepts of learning and assessment, what holds true for the
role of fidelity in assessment may not always hold true for learning, and vice versa. To
bring clarity to this issue, the author distinguishes the role of fidelity in learning from
its role in assessment as a function of skill level by applying the hypothesis of Alessi
(1988) and reviewing the Laughery, Ditzian, and Houtman (1982) study on simulator
validity. Alessi hypothesized that there is a point beyond which one additional unit of
flight-simulator fidelity results in a diminished rate of learning. The author of this
current paper also suggests the existence of an optimal point beyond which one
additional unit of flight-simulator fidelity results in a diminished rate of practical
assessment of nonexpert pilot performance.
INTRODUCTION
Fidelity is a concept that expresses the degree to which a simulator or
simulated experience imitates the real world. It has been viewed as a critical
variable in the design of both mechanical simulators and computerized
simulation experiences. For years, the aviation-training community has
held fast to the belief that a high level of fidelity is required to produce the
highest level of transfer of learning to the actual equipment. This concept
was driven by intuitive appeal, as exemplified by Klauer (1997) in the
following text: “The closer a flight simulator corresponds to the actual
flight environment (i.e., high physical fidelity), the more skills will transfer
to the aircraft” (p. 13). This current paper provides evidence that supports
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the viewpoint that this common belief may not always be true for all
learners in all cases involving training and assessment in flight-simulation
devices. Furthermore, it distinguishes the level of fidelity required of
simulation devices designed to optimize the transfer of learning throughout
the training cycle from that required of simulation devices designed to
assess performance in the actual aircraft.
The total-fidelity concept may be most appropriate for the training and
assessment of expert pilots who readily identify and process all the visual,
aural, and other contextual cues of real-world aviation tasks. Novice pilots
can become overwhelmed with total fidelity. Implemented in part-task
emergency trainers, however, high levels of fidelity that are limited to
actual equipment in the cockpit, excluding the fidelity of the real-world,
out-of-the-cockpit environment, may be quite effective for novice pilots.
This is because, initially, novice pilots must first familiarize themselves
with the look, shape, location, and feel of the actual devices in the cockpit
to aid in the memory and execution of emergency procedures. The
procedures should become second nature for survival. Most flight-training
programs require memorization of these procedures before actual flight,
reflecting motivation, safety consciousness, and good piloting habits. An
example might be extinguishing a simulated engine fire or responding to a
simulated engine failure. If the novice pilot cannot perform the maneuver
on the ground, then grave difficulty performing the procedure in the air,
where dynamic situations require more attentional resources, can be
expected.
The fidelity of a real-world flight environment may detract from, rather
than enhance, the performance of a novice pilot (Miller, 1974). This stands
to reason because, when it comes to assessment in the real world, expert
pilots are expected to react accurately and efficiently, whereas novice pilots
are expected to make frequent mistakes in the learning process. It can
therefore be deduced that high fidelity is desired in simulation-based
assessment devices that propose to predict expert pilot performance in real-
world situations; however, the same may not hold true for the practical
assessment of pilots with skill and experience levels falling between novice
and expert. Moreover, high levels of total fidelity may be of little value for
enhancing the transfer of learning of novice pilots, except for limited
procedural checklists in part-task trainers. With part-task trainers, novice
pilots can build confidence in procedural knowledge, while enhancing
safety and learning from mistakes (Feifer, 1994).
Empirical evidence on the relationship between the degree of flight
simulator/simulation-device fidelity and learning transfer and learning rate
can be misleading if the reviewer fails to carefully scrutinize the learning
stage of the participants in the experiments. Failure of researchers to
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consider the learning stage(s) of the sample population may corrupt
simulator/simulation-fidelity studies that (a) propose to predict participant
performance on the operational equipment in the real world, or (b) propose
to measure the ability of a simulation device to transfer learning to actual
operational equipment in real-world operations.
FIDELITY RESEARCH
Alessi (1988) and Valverde (1973) outlined some of the major studies
providing empirical evidence on the relationship between the degree of
flight-simulator fidelity or simulation-device fidelity and learning rate and
transfer of learning. For example, Wolfe (1978) found that medium fidelity
is better for learning than low fidelity in business simulations where the
degree of complexity of the business simulation concurrently represents the
degree of fidelity. Roscoe (1971, 1972) and Povenmire and Roscoe (1973)
found that initial training in a flight simulator was more efficient than in
actual aircraft, up to a point, after which transfer of learning began to
decrease.
Cox, Wood, Boren, and Thorne (1965) and Grimsley (1969) discovered
there was no difference in learning rate and transfer of learning in
mechanical flight simulators with different degrees of fidelity. Similarly,
Hopkins (1975) discovered that motion fidelity in mechanical flight
simulators had no significant effect on learning. Koonce (1974), however,
clarified that motion fidelity in mechanical flight simulators holds a
measure of importance for expert pilots, but no value for novice pilots.
These few studies are examples demonstrating the importance of
confirming the learning stage of each study participant before generalizing
the findings of any research or specific relationships between degree of
fidelity and learning, transfer of learning, and the ability of a
simulator/flight-simulation device to predict performance in the real world
on actual operational equipment. It is important that such verification is
specifically addressed in the findings of any related study.
General-Aviation Trainer Effectiveness
Povenmire and Roscoe (1973) conducted research on the effectiveness
of the incremental transfer of a ground-based general-aviation trainer
(GAT)-the Link GAT-1. The study sought to assess the cost effectiveness of
training novice student pilots for private-pilot certification in the Piper
Cherokee PA-28-140B trainer aircraft. The practical issue of determining
the amount of training that would be required on a low-fidelity ground-
based simulator to reach a marginal rate of return and training
effectiveness, in terms of time and cost through student achievement of
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private-pilot certification, was addressed. The ultimate purpose of the study
was to determine the point beyond which the Link GAT-1 ground-
simulation device became inefficient in terms of cost for optimizing
transfer of learning for private-pilot certification of novice pilots in the
Piper Cherokee PA-28-140B aircraft. Low fidelity characterized the Link
GAT-1 trainer, which was used to transfer the skills of novice pilots to high-
fidelity operational equipment in real-world airspace. Consequently, the
issue of fidelity and the associated transfer of learning for novice pilots was
a focus of the research. However, no further generalizations or applications
to intermediate or expert pilot-skill level should be gleaned from the
Povenmire and Roscoe study.
The sample population of the Povenmire and Roscoe (1973) research
consisted of 65 inexperienced student pilots who completed a private-pilot
Aviation 101 course at the university serving as the study site. The gender
and age of the participants were not disclosed. They had no prior flight
instruction and were considered novice student pilots. The study
population was divided into one control group and three experimental
groups. Participants within the three experimental groups were selected
from six regularly scheduled flight-operation class periods offered by the
institute of aviation within the participating university. They were then
randomly assigned to primary flight instructors and to one of the three
experimental groups—Group 3, Group 7, or Group 11—also referred to as
the transfer groups. The control group received no training in the Link
GAT-1 simulation device. The experimental groups received 3, 7, and 11
hours of training, respectively, in the simulation device. Both the control
group and the transfer groups received routine training in the Piper
Cherokee PA-23-140B aircraft until completion of their flight training.
Only data from the 65 participants who successfully completed flight
training were used to determine the effectiveness of the transfer from the
Link GAT-1 simulation device to the Piper Cherokee PA-23-140B aircraft.
Transfer effectiveness was determined by comparing the total time required
to train each participant within both study groups.
The routine flight syllabus used in the Povenmire and Roscoe (1973)
study was characterized by incremental 10-hour flight evaluations in the
Piper Cherokee PA-23-140B aircraft, as well as a final recommendation by
the primary and secondary flight instructors confirming the readiness of the
student for the private-pilot check-ride. The primary and secondary
instructors would typically fly together with the student on a single flight to
assess the suitability of their joint recommendation. The instrument used to
evaluate flight performance was the Illinois Private Pilot Performance
Scale (Povenmire, Alvarez, & Damos, 1970). This scale is claimed to have
an observer-to-observer reliability of .80 (McGrath & Harris, 1971; Selzer,
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Hulin, Alvarez, Swarzendruber, & Roscoe, 1972). The instrument was used
in conjunction with the Federal Aviation Administration Practical Test
Guide for Private Pilot Certification (U.S. Department of Transportation,
Federal Aviation Administration, 1970). Ten maneuvers were scored for
each student participating in the Povenmire and Roscoe study who was
recommended for the check-ride. The maneuvers were scored at each
incremental, 10-hour stage check. Equal weight was assigned to each
maneuver on each check. Maneuver performance measures were based
upon four to six variables that could be quantified by the primary flight
instructor on all of the stage checks. For example, if the student deviated
beyond the maximum 10-degree-of-heading parameter, the maximum
deviation would be recorded.
The instructors pooled the scores of each maneuver from the preterminal
recommendation flight for all those confirmed as ready for the terminal
flight. Passing scores were tallied by the maximum amount of deviation
made from the predefined parameters for each of the 10 maneuvers. From
this pool of scores, a standard deviation was calculated for each maneuver.
Subsequently, a modified z score was assigned for each maneuver by
dividing the deviation criteria by the standard deviation established from
the pool of passing scores. The mean z score was then calculated for each
incremental, 10-hour check flight, for each student, up to the final check
flight. The z scores of each 10-hour stage checkpoint were plotted on a
chart in a straight line; specifically, between each 10-hour, 20-hour, 30-
hour, and final check flight for each student. From this chart, a straight line
was calculated for each member of the pool. The average of all the scores of
the recommended students from the control group and the three
experimental groups was used as the private-pilot flight criterion.
Table 1 reveals the number and distribution of students who completed
fight training in the Povenmire and Roscoe (1973) study. Table 2 reveals the
specific amount of flight time required for students within both the control
group and experimental groups to pass their terminal flight checks for
certification as private pilots. Table 3 reveals the flight time in hours that
students in both study groups accumulated to attain the private-pilot
proficiency criterion (i.e., the z score). Table 4 reveals the results of the
analysis of variance (ANOVA) determining the number of hours of flight
time the successful students of both groups accumulated to pass their
terminal check-rides. This analysis was conducted independently (i.e., the
control group without Link GAT-1 training and the three experimental
groups with 3, 7, and 11 hours of training in the Link GAT-1 simulation
device, respectively) with unequal numbers of students. Table 4 also
reveals that the average flight times at which participants in both study
groups passed their terminal flight checks differed both orderly and
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Table 1. Flight-Training Completion Rates
Group Total Students Students Percentage
students passed failed passed
Control 20 14 6 70
3 hours in GAT-1 14 13 1 93
7 hours in GAT-1 14 9 5 64
11 hours in GAT-1 17 10 7 59
Totals 65 46 19 71
Nonexperimental 20 17 3 85
All students 85 63 22 74
Note. GAT = ground-based general-aviation trainer. Adapted from “Incremental Transfer effectiveness of a
Ground-Based General Aviation Trainer,” by H. Kingsley Povenmire and Stanley N. Roscoe, 1973, Human
Factors, 15(6), p. 537. Copyright 1973 by the American Psychological Association. Adapted with
permission.
Table 2. Flight Hours Needed to Pass Final Check and Summary of Resulting
Transfer Measures
Data Type Control Group Transfer Groups
0 3 7 11
Hours in 0 3 7 11
GAT-1
Hours in Cherokee 41.3 44.8 42.7 37.3
45.6 44.8 42.7 37.5
48.0 47.5 40.2 40.7
49.0 44.3 43.3 39.6
46.0 40.6 42.5 34.8
43.3 25.6 42.8 35.8
43.7 32.4 35.8 40.1
53.7 43.2 35.0 37.1






N 14 13 9 10
X 45.42 40.26 38.62 37.93
s 4.51 6.00 5.07 2.45
Cumulative Savings 5.16 6.80 7.49
Incremental Savings 5.16 1.64 0.69
Transfer (%) 11.00 15.00 16.00
Note. GAT = ground-based general-aviation trainer. Adapted from “Incremental Transfer effectiveness of a
Ground-Based General Aviation Trainer,” by H. K. Povenmire and S. N. Roscoe, 1973, Human Factors,
15(6), p. 538. Copyright 1973 by the American Psychological Association. Adapted with permission.
reliably, as indicated by a probability factor (p = .0014) based upon a
summary of the ANOVA for the independent groups. Table 5 reveals the
results of the ANOVA determining the flight times at which successful
students in both the control and experimental subgroups achieved the
private-pilot performance criterion. The difference between the mean times
calculated for the participants of the control and transfer groups to reach the
performance criterion and pass the terminal check-ride was not statistically
significant.
Noble 39
Table 3. Flight Hours Needed to Reach Proficiency Criterion and Summary of
Resulting Transfer Measures
Data Type Control Group Transfer Groups
0 3 7 11
Hours in 0 3 7 11
GAT-1
Hours in
Cherokee 29.54 47.59 33.78 35.62
47.23 39.88 41.52 30.55
42.64 60.00 41.94 43.76
42.26 38.88 34.45
37.71 45.54 57.74 33.99
34.32 23.56 47.56 28.93
45.46 25.74 37.70 34.46
40.48 38.82 25.87 59.27






N 14.00 12 9 10
X 44.49 39.90 38.27 37.30
s 9.64 9.76 11.28 8.82
Cumulative Savings 4.59 6.22 7.19
Incremental Savings 4.59 1.63 0.97
Transfer (%) 10.00 14.00 16.00
Note. GAT = ground-based general-aviation trainer. Adapted from “Incremental Transfer Effectiveness of
a Ground-Based General Aviation Trainer,” by H. K. Povenmire and S. N. Roscoe, 1973, Human Factors,
15(6), p. 539. Copyright 1973 by the American Psychological Association. Adapted with permission.
Implications. There were no standardized instructor lesson plans for the
Link GAT-1 simulation device documented in the Povenmire and Roscoe
(1973) study. The implication here is that, due to a lack of well-defined,
standard operational procedures for the type and quality of training in the
Link GAT-1 simulation device, the data collected in the study may have
been compromised. This is because the data may have reflected the degree
of instructor effectiveness with the students in the experimental groups,
rather than the degree of simulator effectiveness and transfer of learning
from the Link GAT-1 simulation device to the Piper Cherokee PA-23-140B
aircraft. This may account for the inverse relationship between the
percentages of students who passed within each experimental group and the
number of hours each experimental group was exposed to the Link GAT-1
simulation device (see Table 1). The researchers commented that a chi-
square test indicated a probability coefficient of 0.5 for the differences in
the success ratios among the control group and the three experimental
groups; however, this observation is moot. The important point is that, if the
type of treatment received by each experimental group in the Link GAT-1
simulation device had been controlled, the probability of differences in
success ratios among the control group and the three experimental groups
as factors of chance may have been reduced. Furthermore, most instructors
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Table 4. Analysis of Variance in Times Final Flight Check Passed
Sources of variance df MS F p
Hours in GAT-1 3 141.97 6.19 .0014
(Groups: 0, 3, 7, 11)
Participants/Groups 42 22.93
Total 45
Note. GAT = ground-based general-aviation trainer. Adapted from “Incremental Transfer Effectiveness of a
Ground-Based General Aviation Trainer,” by H. K. Povenmire and S. N. Roscoe, 1973, Human Factors,
15(6), p. 539. Copyright 1973 by the American Psychological Association. Adapted with permission.
Table 5. Analysis of Variance in Times to Reach Private-Pilot Performance Criterion
Sources of variance df MS F p
Hours in GAT-1 3 124.82 1.29 .2914
(Groups: 0, 3, 7, 11)
Participants/Groups 42 96.95
Total 45
Note. GAT = ground-based general-aviation trainer. Adapted from “Incremental Transfer Effectiveness of
a Ground-Based General Aviation Trainer,” by H. K. Povenmire and S. N. Roscoe, 1973, Human Factors,
15(6), p. 539. Copyright 1973 by the American Psychological Association. Adapted with permission.
are not taught how to use the simulator as an effective instructional tool,
which could have also affected the results.
Accurate assessment of the amount of student learning that transferred
from the Link GAT-1 trainer to the Piper Cherokee PA-23-140B aircraft
was partially dependent upon the point at which student-learning curves
intersected precalculated criterion levels of private-pilot performance. It
was also determined by the number of flight hours required to pass the
terminal check-ride in the Piper Cherokee PA-23-140B aircraft. The reason
the two measures were proposed was because of the varying learning rates
among the participants. The implication is that this variation must be
controlled to ensure that the findings measure transfer of learning rather
than learning rate. To account for this variable, a least-squares criterion
straight line was “fitted to all the check scores each student received on the
Illinois Private Pilot Performance Scale throughout training” (Povenmire &
Roscoe, 1973, p. 537).
Finally, a gradual reduction in the effectiveness of the Link GAT-1
simulation trainer used in the Povenmire and Roscoe (1973) study, in terms
of transfer of training, was evident. The implication is that, as the skill level
of the learner improves, low-quality fidelity devices become less effective
in terms of the funds invested to build them versus their training efficiency.
The larger implication here, however, is that the level of fidelity in flight-
simulator devices built to transfer learning to real-world operational tasks
in real-world operational airspace may need to be adjusted to the learning
stage of the respective pilot for optimal transfer. Furthermore, degree of
fidelity, learning stage of the student, and the goals of the training device
are not mutually exclusive.
It is evident from the Povenmire and Roscoe (1973) research that the
learning stage of students must be clarified, controlled, and monitored
throughout an experiment before applying the evidence to practical use in
training pilots or assessing pilot performance on flight-simulation devices.
Without this understanding, unsound generalizations can potentially be
made that could result in impractical expense, especially due to the high
cost of fidelity (Miller, 1953). Furthermore, the potential for
implementation of unsound generalizations may radiate to professional
educators, psychologists, and cognitive engineers who could mistakenly
apply such findings to the learning/assessment process. Therefore, the
learning stages of student pilots must be clearly distinguished when
comparing empirical evidence on studies proposing relationships between
the degree of fidelity in flight-simulator devices and transfer of learning,
learning rate, and prediction validity of student performance on actual
operational equipment in the real world.
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Training fallacies. Schneider (1985) provides empirical evidence and an
excellent overview of the training fallacies that can potentially result from
unsound generalizations. One of these fallacies is that practice always
makes perfect. This is not always true. For example, in the flight domain,
novice pilots must develop time-sharing skill, which allows them to
efficiently divide their limited attentional resources to the many tasks
encountered both inside and outside the cockpit. By optimizing
performance of a single task, novice pilots can inadvertently fixate on a
single component of a time-shared task. This, in turn, can inhibit the
division of attention that is required of a time-shared task (e.g., scanning
instruments during a flight maneuver). In this manner, a negative transfer of
learning can occur, in terms of the critical time-shared skills novice pilots
must develop to achieve acceptable levels of flight proficiency.
Antithetically, the fallacy that total-task training is required for maximal
transfer of learning may be true for the expert pilot who is familiar with
high-fidelity environments and who can only improve his or her learning
level through challenging and somewhat unfamiliar flight scenarios
accompanied by demanding flight tasks (Schneider, 1985). Transfer of
learning through these high-skill tasks may lead to automation and further
reduce workload. However, the same might not be true for the intermediate
pilot who is more unfamiliar with such tasks. In this case, the intermediate
or novice pilot could falter in performance (Wiggins, 1997).
Another training fallacy is that extrinsic motivators for expert pilots
inhibit concentration (Schneider, 1985). This suggests that external
stimulus will always interfere with experts who perform tasks requiring
heavy concentration. Conversely, boredom sometimes accompanies tasks
of repeated concentration because the task is a familiar one. An interfering
stimulus may provide the extra level of difficulty that sparks a challenge
within the expert, along with greater and more efficient concentration.
Schneider also revealed the fallacy that the primary goal of skill training is
accurate performance. This cannot be true of air-traffic controllers who
must focus their attention on the general separation of aircraft while
concurrently attending to the accuracy of pilot readbacks while the pilots
are flying on final approach to landing. Although it is important for the
expert controller to attend to the accuracy of pilot readbacks, the real-world
mission is to ensure the separation of aircraft.
Another fallacy is that the conceptual understanding of systems that is
acquired in the classroom will develop needed performance skills within
the flight domain. Although the conceptual understanding of systems
obtained within a training program may enhance procedural knowledge,
the time-sharing skills required of pilots can only be developed via hands-
on experience. The fallacies documented by Schneider (1985) should
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always be considered when conducting experiments where degree of
fidelity, learning rates, and learning stages are pivotal factors.
The Alessi Hypothesis
From an intuitive viewpoint, it would appear that the higher the level of
fidelity in flight simulators and in flight simulation, the higher their
prediction validity would be for pilot performance on operational
equipment in real-world airspace (i.e., check-rides in actual airspace on
operational equipment). It is tempting to carry this hypothesis one step
further and deduce that the closer mechanical and computerized simulators
can emulate the real world, the more efficiently they can train and aid in the
transfer of learning to the actual equipment in real-world operational
scenarios. Such a deduction, however, could be misleading without
consideration of the stage of the learner. The learner is an integral part of
the machine-environment system.
Alessi (1988) clearly illustrated the role of fidelity within different
learning stages. He hypothesized the existence of a marginal rate of return
on learning and fidelity based upon the stage of the learner. The law of
diminishing returns states that a point exists beyond which one additional
unit of simulation fidelity results in a diminished rate of return on
investment. Figure 1 prompts the following question: How much fidelity
should be programmed into a simulation experience or built into a
mechanical simulator? Alessi (1988) proposes that the degree of fidelity on
a computerized simulation experience should match the goal and the
training stage of the learner. Miller (1953) originated this viewpoint and his
original terminology for fidelity was degree of simulation. He hypothesized
the existence of a relationship between the degree of learning transfer, cost,
and engineering simulation. He recognized that the higher the degree of
fidelity, the higher the cost of the training device. Furthermore, Miller
recognized that the more familiar students became with a simulator or
simulation device designed for transfer of learning, the greater amount of
fidelity they needed to sustain adequate transfer-of-learning rates (i.e.,
positive transfer). Hays and Singer (1989) pointed out that “task types and
the trainee’s level of learning, as well as other variables, interact with
Miller’s hypothesized relationships” (p. 31). The viewpoint espoused by
Alessi (1988) is that fidelity is only critical in terms of how much should be
used in flight-simulation experiences, not necessarily that high amounts of
fidelity are needed for all learners in all cases. Students may benefit from
increased amounts of fidelity as their training progresses.
Alessi and Trollip (1991) proposed the following four stages of effective
instruction: presentation, guidance, practice, and assessment. Each stage of
instruction should present increasing degrees of simulation fidelity
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constrained by return on investment and the stage of the learner. Regarding
the assessment stage, Gagne (1954) suggested that the highest level of
fidelity should be reserved for measuring (i.e., assessing) performance of
expert pilots. He recognized the existence of diminished rate of return on
the learning rate of expert pilots with increased fidelity alone and,
furthermore, that expert pilots require high levels of fidelity and difficult
tasks to enhance transfer of learning. The implication here is that there is a
point beyond which training devices fail to sufficiently motivate experts,
even with high degrees of fidelity, if the design of the simulator and/or
simulation device fail to sufficiently challenge the ability of the individual
to handle novel tasks of increasing difficulty. On the other hand, novice
pilots may be overburdened or confused by excess fidelity and/or a training
task that is overly difficult for learning or assessment purposes. Therefore,
interface designers, educators, experimental psychologists, cognitive
engineers, and other aviation experts must weigh the state and training
stage of the learner when determining the extent of fidelity to program into
mechanical simulators and computerized simulation devices (Flach,
Hancock, Caird, & Vicente, 1995).
The information that expert, intermediate-level, and novice pilots
process is not always the same; therefore, the spare capacity of limited
attentional resources for each piloting-skill level will not be the same for all
tasks. What is overwhelming for the novice pilot may be handled with ease
by an expert who will have more spare capacity to attend to other tasks
upon completion of a given task or set of tasks. Antithetically, the novice
pilot may fail to process certain visual and aural cues that would induce
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Figure 1. This illustration displays the relationship between degree of fidelity and learning for
novice, experienced learners, and expert learners. (Alessi, 1988, p. 42).
added workload for the intermediate- or expert-level pilot. This could prove
disastrous in situations that require accurate and efficient processing of
critical information for flight safety. Clearly, simulators and simulation
devices must be designed for the learning stage of the learner.
Consequently, it is imperative to distinguish the roles of fidelity for training
and assessment by the goals of the simulator or simulation device and the
stage of the learner when using such devices as learning and assessment
tools. Finally, the concept of learning and assessment must be viewed as
complementary to training.
The Training Cycle and the Learner
A clear understanding of the general relationship between training,
instruction, and performance assessment is necessary before
comprehension of the specific differences between the role of fidelity in
flight instruction and performance assessment is possible. As described
earlier, Alessi and Trollip (1991) viewed the relationship between fidelity,
stage of the learner, and task difficulty in the following four proposed
stages of instruction: presentation, guidance, practice, and assessment.
Assuming that these four stages of instruction are increasingly demanding,
requiring the learner to expend added attentional resources with tasks of
increasing difficulty (Kahneman, 1973; Norman & Bobrow, 1975), the
state of learners and their stage of training become mandatory
considerations in determining the amount of fidelity to use in simulators
and simulation devices.
Figure 2 illustrates the major subsystems within the training cycle. It
identifies instruction as a component of training and assessment as a
component of instruction. It illustrates that, in addition to the state of the
learner, training goals, objectives, and tasks must be considered during the
needs-assessment stage of any training program. Assessment is embedded
within the development and implementation stage of any training-program
design.
Similar to the design cycle of computer products, the final stage of the
training cycle provides feedback for practical issues such as cost, time to
train, and assessment accuracy. This process can be applied to simulators
and simulation devices used to transfer learning to actual equipment, as
well as to devices implemented to assess (i.e., measure) terminal
performance (i.e., check-rides). The concept of training effectiveness
emerges from these relationships. This concept requires measurement of
the transfer of learning to real-world equipment to achieve positive results.
It also requires measurement of the ability of any specific device to predict
trainee performance in the real world (i.e., prediction validity). There is a
distinct difference in these two measures because a training device is not
Noble 45
required to be validated to aid in the transfer of learning; however, a device
that predicts performance does require validation. Therefore, the concepts
of learning and performance assessment are separate, yet inseparable,
elements of training.
Transfer of Learning Versus Prediction of Performance
Laughery et al. (1982) conducted a study that distinguished between the
discrete characteristics of simulation devices built to ensure a high transfer
of learning and those built to predict real-world performance. The research
demonstrated that a KC-135 Boom-Operator Part-Task Trainer (BOPTT),
configured to simulate refueling of an F4 fighter-jet aircraft, was an
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Figure 2. This figure illustrates the role of assessment within the training cycle. (Hays &
Singer, 1989, p. 8).
effective simulation device for ensuring higher transfer of learning for an
experimental group of boom operators qualified to refuel the B-52 aircraft
in their initial training. Despite the high transfer of learning from the
simulation trainer, the device was not reliable in predicting student
performance for the F-4 refueling categorization.
The control group in the Laughery et al. (1982) study, comprised of
participants with no training in the C-5 (large cargo aircraft) or F-4
configuration versions of the simulation trainer, scored 100% qualified on
an actual C-5 in-flight refueling experience. These individuals had also
previously qualified in the refueling of the B-52 aircraft. This demonstrated
that initial qualification for refueling the B-52 aircraft was similar to the
refueling experience of the C-5. Prediction validity of the BOPTT was
100% for the refueling of the C-5 for both the control and experimental
groups who were all initially qualified to refuel the B-52 aircraft.
Therefore, although a training device of high fidelity can aid in the transfer
of learning, the concept of transfer cannot be generalized to assessment or
to prediction validity of a simulation device without considering the state of
the environment (e.g., refueling the C-5 versus the F-4).
The purpose of the Laughery et al. (1982) study was twofold: (a) to
measure and compare the transfer of learning for both groups to determine
if a part-task trainer could optimize operational costs and training time, and
(b) to determine if BOPTT was a valid predictor of performance for
refueling fighter jets and cargo aircraft using operational aircraft in
operational airspace. The research was divided into two phases. The first
was conducted at a California Air- Force base and involved simulation
training on the BOPTT and categorization briefings for the C-5 and F-4
aircraft. The second phase was conducted at the home squadrons of the
study participants and involved actual in-flight evaluations on refueling the
C-5 and F-4 aircraft. In Phase 1, 30 student boom operators, who were
initially qualified to refuel the B-52 bomber aircraft in flight, were divided
into a control group and an experimental group. Five students were selected
each month over a period of 6 months from six separate classes of flight-
line-designated trainees. Initially, six students were to comprise the control
group; however, after half of the experiment was completed, it was decided
that 10 students should comprise the control group and 20 should be
assigned to the experimental group to increase the accuracy of the learning
transfer.
The second phase of the Laughery et al. (1982) study measured the
number of real-world flights required for the students in both study groups
to qualify on fueling operations for both the C-5 cargo aircraft and F-4
fighter-jet aircraft. The students in both the control and experimental
groups had received the same training, using the same training syllabus, up
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through their graduation and solo flight. Prior to evaluating the ability of
both groups to refuel the C-5 and F-4 aircraft, the groups received separate
research treatment. The control group received what was termed Treatment
A, and the experimental group received Treatment B. Treatment A consisted
of separate categorization briefings for the F-4 fighter aircraft and the C-5
cargo aircraft. Treatment B consisted of Treatment A, plus two one-hour
simulation experiences on refueling a C-5 cargo plane and three one-hour
simulation experiences on refueling the F-4 fighter aircraft. The device
used to deliver the simulation experiences to the experimental group was
the KC-135 BOPTT, which could be configured for novice, intermediate,
or expert pilots (Clapp, 1985).
The BOPTT was built with a student station and boom-operator pallet
with window operator controls and indicators (Laughery et al., 1982). To
simulate oncoming aircraft needing refueling, a model of a C-5 or F-4
aircraft, which was scaled down 100 times, was viewed outside the training
device. The BOPTT housed a 20-inch aerial refueling boom, and the 1/100
scale model of the C-5 or F-4 was mounted on a gimbal that delivered pitch,
roll, and yawing moments. A closed-circuit video displayed the appropriate
aircraft onto a cathode-ray-tube screen 20 inches outside the student’s
window. The model boom was located between the window and the model
aircraft. The student could manipulate the boom mechanism by extending it
and simulate connecting it to the aircraft. Environmental features, such as
clouds, were visible on the cathode-ray tube. Engine noise and noise from
operation of the boom could be heard through speakers inside the boom
operator’s station. The BOPTT simulation device showed the approaching
C-5 cargo aircraft or the F-4 fighter-jet aircraft from a simulated 1.5-mile
distance up to the refueling point from the window of the KC-135 aircraft.
The device allowed for manipulation of independent variables such as
turbulence, trajectory of the oncoming aircraft to the refueler aircraft, and
refueling speed and altitude. It was also able to simulate five piloting-skill
levels.
Procedures. Following simulation training in C-5 and F-4 fueling on the
BOPTT, the students in the experimental group of the Laughery et al.
(1982) study were evaluated on a real-time refueling-assessment flight for
the C-5 cargo aircraft and on another for the F-4 fighter-jet aircraft.
Students participating in the control group received no refueling-
simulation training on the BOPTT for either C-5 cargo or F-4 fighter
aircraft. The evaluation proposed to measure the ability of the students in
both study groups to refuel both the C-5 and the F-4 aircraft in actual
operational airspace. A training and evaluation squadron located at the base
serving as the study site conducted the experiment with a sister squadron
located at another training facility within the state of California.
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The Boom-Operator Qualification-Performance Measurement Form
was used as the criterion for both study groups in the Laughery et al. (1982)
research. The instrument measured student execution of critical
procedures, communications, boom control, and boom operation. The
experimental group was evaluated on each simulation experience and on
each actual flight for the C-5 and F-4 aircraft. The control group was
evaluated on actual flights only. Following data collection at the
participating base, a questionnaire was subsequently distributed to the
home squadrons of the participants to gather data on the actual amount of
time they required to qualify in the refueling of the C-5 and F-4 aircraft.
Table 6 illustrates the design of the Laughery et al. (1982) study. Table 7
reveals the number of flights required for the student participants to qualify
in the refueling of the C-5 and F-4 aircraft at their home squadrons. A one-
way ANOVA on the number of flights required for the students in the
control group, experimental group, and their classmates to qualify in the C-
5 and F-4 aircraft indicates a significant difference among the three
research treatments among the control and experimental groups (p < .05).
This suggests that significant savings can be realized with categorization
training via implementation of the BOPTT.
Table 8 provides the number and percentages of students from both of
the study groups who were found either qualified or unqualified to refuel
the F-4 fighter aircraft from the KC-135 aircraft at the end of the applied
treatments. Although all of the participants in the experimental group were
found qualified to refuel F-4 fighters in the BOPTT, only half of them
qualified on the actual equipment in the air. Only 20% of the control group
qualified for refueling the F-4 fighter aircraft at the end of their respective
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Table 6. Study Design: Categorization Research
C5 F4
CAT CAT
Groups Training Evaluation Training Evaluation
Control CAT Actual C-5 CAT Actual F-4
(10 Subjects) briefing air refueling briefing air refueling
Experimental Two 1-hour Actual C-5 Two 1-hour Actual F-4




Note. CAT = categorization; BOPTT = boom-operator part-task trainer. Adapted from “Differences
Between Transfer Effectiveness and Student Performance Evaluations on Simulators: Theory and Practice
of Evaluations,” by K. R. Laughery, J. L. Ditzian and G. M. Houtman, 1982, Proceedings of the I/ITEC
Interservice Industry Training Equipment Conference, USA, p. 219. Copyright 1982 by ITEC. Adapted
with permission.
research treatment. This clearly indicated that the BOPTT was useful in
transferring learning to the F-4 aircraft; however, it was not a valid
predictor of performance on real-world F-4 refueling operations.
Table 9 displays data indicating that all of the students participating in
the Laughery et al. (1982) study-in both the control and experimental
groups-were found to be qualified in the refueling of the C-5 aircraft from a
KC-135 aircraft platform. It was impossible to determine if the BOPTT was
a valid predictor of performance on the C-5 refueling operations because all
of the student participants were considered qualified to refuel this aircraft
from the KC-135 aircraft following their respective research treatments.
Consideration should be given to the fact that all of the students in both
study groups had been initially qualified to refuel the B-52 aircraft from the
KC-135 before the research treatments were received; therefore, it could be
concluded that the fueling operations of B-52 and C-5 aircraft are very
similar.
The implication here is that near transfer of learning must be
distinguished from far transfer of learning when making generalizations
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Table 7. Flights Required to Qualify
No. of Flights
Groups One Two Three Four Five
Control 3 (37.5%) 1 (12.5%) 2 (25.0%) 1 (12.5%) 1 (12.5%)
Experimental 6 (42.85%) 6 (42.85%) 2 (14.3%)
Othera 5 (17.9%) 11 (39.3%) 8 (28.6%) 2 (7.1%) 2 (7.1%)
Note. Adapted from “Differences Between Transfer Effectiveness and Student Performance Evaluations on
Simulators: Theory and Practice of Evaluations,” by K. R.Laughery, J. L. Ditzian and G. M. Houtman,
1982, Proceedings of the I/ITEC Interservice Industry Training Equipment Conference, USA, p. 220.
Copyright 1982 by ITEC. Adapted with permission.
a These individuals did not participate in the test program but were classmates of the participating members.
Table 8. In-Flight Performance for Fighter Category (F-4) Qualification
Considered qualified Considered unqualified
Group in aircraft in aircraft
Control 2 (20%) 8 (80%)
Experimental 10 (53%) 9 (47%)
Note. Adapted from “Differences Between Transfer Effectiveness and Student Performance Evaluations on
Simulators: Theory and Practice of Evaluations,” by K. R. Laughery, J. L. Ditzian and G. M. Houtman,
1982, Proceedings of the I/ITEC Interservice Industry Training Equipment Conference, USA, p. 220.
Copyright 1982 by ITEC. Adapted with permission.
related to learning transfer and prediction validity of simulation devices
(Osgood, 1949). Self-transfer is the improvement or decrement of the
learner that results from repeated practice of the same event. Near transfer
is the improvement or decrement that results from repeated practice of
different, but very similar events. Far transfer is the improvement or
decrement that results from repeated practice of dissimilar events in a
similar domain. All three types of transfer must occur for optimal
effectiveness of training and evaluation. Theoretically, each type of transfer
should precede the other in the learning process because learning is a
cumulative process. Likewise, in the training and assessment of novice,
intermediate, and expert pilots under training, methods of learning and
assessment should be consistently aligned with the appropriate level of
learning taking place throughout the training cycle.
Implications. Laughery et al. (1982) demonstrated the basic difference
between the relationship of near transfer of learning with far transfer of
learning as it relates to the discovery of prediction validity and transfer of
learning from simulation devices to actual equipment in real-world
operations. Some simulators may propose to accurately assess student
performance in real-world operational aircraft, while others may propose to
measure transfer of learning only. Those such as the BOPTT when it is in
the B-52 configuration, claim to do both in environment-specific
configurations. The BOPTT did not, however, prove to be a good predictor
for aircraft categorization assessment, even though it was indeed an
excellent tool for improving learning rate in refueling the F-4 aircraft.
A clear understanding of the definition of terms is critical when making
generalizations from experimental studies. For example, transfer is defined
by Gick and Holyoak as “the change in the performance of a task as a result
of the prior performance of a different task” (cited in Cormier & Hagman,
1987, p. 10). Osgood (1949) defines transfer as the ability to perform the
same task in the same environment. It involves the ability of a student to
demonstrate skills learned from practice on a training device to
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Table 9. In-Flight Performance for Cargo Category (C-5) Qualification
Considered qualified Considered unqualified
Group in aircraft in aircraft
Control 8 0
Experimental 13 0
Note. Adapted from “Differences Between Transfer Effectiveness and Student Performance Evaluations on
Simulators: Theory and Practice of Evaluations,” by K. R. Laughery, J. L. Ditzian and G. M. Houtman,
1982, Proceedings of the I/ITEC Interservice Industry Training Equipment Conference, USA, p. 220.
Copyright 1982 by ITEC. Adapted with permission.
performance on the actual operational equipment. Apparently, refueling of
the C-5 aircraft was similar enough to the refueling of the B-52 aircraft that
slight environmental changes did not affect performance on the same
category of aircraft. Consequently, under the definition of transfer provided
by Osgood, prediction validity of the BOPTT in the B-52 configuration
would be high for the actual refueling of the C-5 cargo aircraft. However,
this was not true for F-4 fighter-jet refueling operations because the
environment was sufficiently different. The definition of transfer provided
by Gick and Holyoak would require a different target situation (cited in
Cormier & Hagman, 1987). Learning from one situation could be
transferred to a new situation with some environmental differences.
The prediction validity of a simulation device is the expression of its
ability to accurately assess the flight performance of a student on real-
world equipment in real-world airspace. If the performance scores attained
on a simulation device closely match scores on the same tasks with actual
operational equipment, then the simulation device is said to have high
prediction validity. However, this does not mean that simulation devices
that are valid predictors of the performance of real-world tasks are effective
for transfer of learning. Similarly, devices that prove to be effective for
transfer of learning may not be valid predictors of performance on actual
equipment (see Table 8). For a simulation device to be a valid predictor of
performance, the device itself must be validated. However, as demonstrated
by Laughery et al. (1982), the same requirement is not always necessary to
maximize transfer of learning, or even to realize a positive transfer of
learning.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the degree of fidelity and the learning stage of the learner
are mutually interdependent variables that must be considered when
designing flight simulators intended for transfer of learning or performance
assessment. It is important to recognize the similarities and differences
between simulators designed for performance assessment and those
designed for transfer of learning. The environment of the target skills is also
a pivotal component. When all these elements are considered it becomes
apparent that degree of fidelity, learning stage of the learner, learning rate,
and the environment are not mutually exclusive. Further research is
necessary to discover if there is a point beyond which one additional unit of
fidelity will result in a diminished rate of practical (i.e., cost-effective)
assessment for pilots who are between the novice and expert stages of
learning. What must be considered, however, is that optimal performance
assessment and transfer of learning in flight training is best served with
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shared goals and aligned values and expectations by all pilots, instructors,
training departments, examiners, and licensing authorities (Telfer &
Moore, 1997).
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SEARCH AND RESCUE OPERATIONS OF





The world aviation community has felt the compelling need for a well-coordinated
global programme for search and rescue operations of aircraft ever since commercial
aviation was regulated in 1944. Guidelines and plans of action for search and rescue
have therefore been considered critical in the event of an aircraft accident. This fact is
eminently brought to bear in the continental regions of Africa and South America in
particular, where vast expanses of land are still uninhabited or sparsely populated and
controlled flight into terrain (CFIT-where an aircraft may crash on land while still
under the control of technical crew) is a common occurrence. There are numerous
guidelines that have been adopted under the umbrella of the International Civil
Aviation Organization which are already in place for the provision of search and
rescue operations pertaining to aircraft. However, when an accident occurs in the
territory of a State, there are sensitivities involving the State in which the aircraft
concerned was registered and issues of sovereignty which have to be considered.
Additionally, issues such as the voluntary nature of the search and rescue services
offered, confidentiality, timeliness of such operations, fairness and uniformity all play
a critical role. This article addresses the issue of search and rescue operations in
Africa and examines in some detail where the world aviation community is right now
and where it is headed in this important field of human endeavour.
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INTRODUCTION
At the 16th Plenary Session of the General Assembly held in Cairo from
21-26April 2001, the African Civil Aviation Commission (AFCAC)
adopted Resolution S16-7 calling African States to participate in the
AFCAC Search and Rescue (SAR) technical cooperation programme. The
Commission, through this resolution, also instructed the AFCAC Bureau,
inter alia, to work, through appropriate means, toward the improvement of
SAR services in Africa, in close cooperation with the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO). The ICAO is a specialized agency of the
United Nations responsible for the regulation of international civil aviation.
After the events of 11 September 2001, it is only natural to assume that
there is heightened awareness of the possibility of aircraft being used as
weapons of destruction in the future. From a social and political
perspective, the world has to prepare for eventualities leading up to SAR of
aircraft that may need to be located without loss of time and with the
passengers and crew rescued. There are already two international treaties
on the subject. The Brussels Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules Relating to Assistance and Salvage of Aircraft at Sea, established
September 29, 1938, has unfortunately not been ratified by the requisite
number of States and has therefore not come into effect. The Brussels
Convention contemplated only assistance and salvage operations at sea.
The other Convention is the Chicago Convention of 1944, which requires
the 187 Contracting States of the ICAO to fulfil their obligations under
Article 25 which provides:
Each Contracting State undertakes to provide such measures of assistance to
aircraft in distress in its territory as it may find practicable, and to permit,
subject to control by its own authorities, the owners of aircraft or authorities of
the State in which the aircraft is registered to provide such measures of
assistance as may be necessitated by the circumstances. Each Contracting
State, when undertaking search for missing aircraft, will collaborate in
coordinated measures which may be recommended from time to time pursuant
to this Convention. (ICAO, 2000a)
Annex 12 to the Chicago Convention elaborates on this fundamental
requirement by qualifying that Contracting States shall arrange for the
establishment and provision of SAR services within their territories on a
24-hour basis. Contracting States are further requested to delineate the
SAR process under Annex 12 on the basis of regional air navigation
agreements and provide such services on a regional basis without overlap
(ICAO, 1975). A SAR region has been defined in Annex 12 as “an area of
defined dimensions within which SAR service is provided” (ICAO, 1975,
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Standard 2.2.1) where boundaries of SAR regions should, insofar as
practicable, be coincident with the boundaries of corresponding flight
information regions.
Although, as discussed, the basic principles of SAR have been in place
since 1952(since Annex 12 was adopted by ICAO—AFCAC has, with
considerable wisdom, recognized in its latest Resolution S16-7 that grave
shortcomings exist in the African and Indian Ocean (AFI) region in the
SAR field. The Commission was quick to recognize that there was a lack of
human and financial resources in many African States, making it difficult
for these States to comply with ICAO Standards and Recommendations,
especially those of Annex 12.
The dilemma facing many States extending both to airports and airlines,
relates to the lack of rapid response, adequate equipment and well-trained
crews, all of which are critical to passenger survival in the event of an
aircraft disaster. Although most States are particularly mindful of these
compelling needs, they are by no means confined to a particular region. An
example of this crisis can be cited with the 1980 incident of a Saudi Arabian
Airlines L-1011 catching fire shortly after leaving Riyadh Airport.
Although the pilot turned back for an emergency landing and made a
perfect touchdown, nearly 30 minutes passed before firemen managed to go
in, by which time all passengers and crew had perished. This could have
been a survivable accident (Morrow, 1995). To the contrary, a hijacking
incident involving a Boeing 767 aircraft on the shores of Comoros, in
November 1996, when the aircraft crashed due to lack of fuel, showed how
spontaneous reaction from even non-trained professionals at rescue efforts
could help. In this instance, the quick response of tourists at the scene
ensured that 51 of the 175 passengers on board were saved (Report, 1996).
This article will outline principles of responsibility of States and
political, economic and humanitarian consequences pertaining to SAR of
aircraft within their territorial boundaries. It is not the intent of this article
to address issues pertaining to rights in recovery of costs incurred in SAR of
aircraft and passengers. For this aspect of SAR see Kadletz, 1997.
POLITICAL ISSUES
Annex 12 to the Chicago Convention requires Contracting States to
coordinate their SAR organizations with those of neighbouring Contracting
States (Recommendation 3.1.2.1) with a recommendation that such States
should, whenever necessary, coordinate their SAR operations with those of
neighbouring States (ICAO, 1975, Standard 3.1.1) and develop common
SAR procedures to facilitate coordination of SAR operations with those of
neighbouring States (Standard 3.1.2). These provisions collectively call
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upon all Contracting States to bond together in coordinating both their SAR
organizations and operations.
At the 32nd Session of the Assembly, held in 1998, ICAO adopted
Resolution A32-14, Appendix O which addresses the provision of SAR
services. This Resolution refers to Article 25 of the Convention in which
each Contracting State undertakes to provide such measures of assistance
to aircraft in distress in its territory as it may find practicable and to
collaborate in coordinated measures which may be recommended from
time to time pursuant to the Convention.
The Resolution mentions Annex 12 to the Convention which contains
specifications relating to the establishment and provision of SAR services
within the territories of Contracting States as well as within areas over the
high seas. The resolution recognizes that Annex 12 specifies that those
portions of the high seas where SAR services will be provided shall be
determined on the basis of regional air navigation agreements, which are
agreements approved by the Council normally on the advice of regional air
navigation meetings. Annex 12 also recommends that boundaries of SAR
regions should, insofar as practicable, be coincident with the boundaries of
corresponding flight information regions.
Article 69 of the Convention, which is also outlined in the Resolution,
specifies that, if the Council is of the opinion that the air navigation services
of a Contracting State are not reasonably adequate for the safe operation of
international air services, present or contemplated, the Council shall
consult with the State directly concerned, and other States affected, with a
view to finding means by which the situation may be remedied, and may
make recommendations for that purpose; and the air navigation services
referred to in Article 69 of the Convention include, inter alia, SAR services.
In taking into consideration the above facts, the Assembly resolves in
A32-14 that the boundaries of SAR regions, whether over States’ territories
or over the high seas, shall be determined on the basis of technical and
operational considerations, including the desirability of coincident flight
information regions and SAR regions, with the aim of ensuring optimum
efficiency with the least overall cost. If any SAR regions need to extend
over the territories of two or more States, or parts thereof, agreement
thereon should be negotiated between the States concerned.
The Resolution also calls upon the providing State, in implementing
SAR services over the territory of the delegating State, to do so in
accordance with the requirements of the delegating State, which shall
establish and maintain in operation such facilities and services for the use
of the providing State as are mutually agreed to be necessary. Any
delegation of responsibility by one State to another or any assignment of
responsibility over the high seas shall be limited to technical and
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operational functions pertaining to the provision of SAR services in the
area concerned. Remedies to any inadequacies in the provision of efficient
SAR services, particularly over the high seas, should be sought through
negotiations with States which may be able to give operational or financial
assistance in SAR operations, with a view to concluding agreements to that
effect.
Furthermore, the Resolution declares that any Contracting State which
delegates to another State the responsibility for providing SAR services
within its territory does so without derogation of its sovereignty; and the
approval by Council of regional air navigation agreements relating to the
provision by a State of SAR services within areas over the high seas does
not imply recognition of sovereignty of that State over the area concerned.
It is also stated in the Resolution that Contracting States should, in
cooperation with other States and ICAO, seek the most efficient delineation
of SAR regions and consider, as necessary, pooling available resources or
establishing jointly a single SAR organization to be responsible for the
provision of SAR services within areas extending over the territories of two
or more States or over the high seas.
Finally, the Resolution calls on the Council to encourage States, whose
air coverage of the SAR regions for which they are responsible cannot be
ensured because of a lack of adequate facilities, to request assistance from
other States to remedy the situation and to negotiate agreements with
appropriate States regarding the assistance to be provided during SAR
operations.
The legal validity of Resolution A32-14, as substantive law recognized
under public international law, and therefore binding on States, is a relevant
They have also adduced reasons for recognizing resolutions adopted within
the United Nations’ system as affirmations of recognized customary law
and as expressions of general principles of law recognized by States. Some
confirmation of these arguments has been given by the ICJ when the Court,
over a period of years, recognized the force of several declarations adopted
within the United Nations (ICJ, 1970; 1975).
In practical application however, non-observance by States purportedly
bound by such resolutions would render such States destitute of the desired
legal effect. This would essentially be the case if there are negative votes or
reservations attached to an Assembly resolution. In the case of A32-14,
however, there is no question of reservation as the Resolution was adopted
by consensus.
The real utility of an Assembly resolution lies in the fact that primarily it
supplements the absence of law in a given area by filling a legal lacuna that
has not been filled by a formal legislative process. Treaty law making is
often long-winded and involves a cumbersome process. A resolution offers
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a quick fix while embodying principles in a declaration that introduces
legitimacy and validity to a given principle or group of principles. In this
context, it would be correct to assume that the ICAO Standards and
Recommended Practices (SARPs) referred to earlier in this paper on the
subject of the implementation of Annex 12 are of equal persuasion.
Together, the resolution and SARPs have a clear and substantial impact,
reflecting the meticulous and thoughtful work that have gone with the
development of these instruments and recognized importance of safety and
efficiency of civil aviation (Joyner, 1997).
In the case of the Africa-Indian Ocean Region, the ICAO Regional Air
Navigation Plan (1997), in Part V addresses issues of SAR by pointing to
the provisions of the ICAO Search and Rescue Manual (Doc 7333),
referring in particular to the need for aircraft to carry specified equipment
(Section 3.1), carry out paper and communications exercises (Section
3.3.a) and, more importantly, for the need for States to pool their resources
and provide mutual assistance in the case of SAR operations. The Plan calls
for precise agreements between States to implement these measures
(Section 4.1). The ICAO Regional Air Navigation Plan also calls upon
States, in order to ensure compatibility between aeronautical and maritime
SAR regions (SRRs), and aeronautical SAR authorities, to maintain close
liaison with their maritime counterparts and the International Maritime
Organization (IMO).
In 1985, ICAO signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the
IMO concerning cooperation with respect to safety of aircraft operations to
and from ships and other marine vehicles and of aeronautical and maritime
SAR activities. Both ICAO and IMO signed this understanding with a view
to ensuring the best possible coordination of activities between the
organizations in matters concerned with the safety of aircraft operations to
and from ships and other marine vehicles and with aeronautical and
maritime SAR operations, agreeing to make arrangements for consultations
between the Secretariats of the two organizations in regard to these matters,
with a view to ensuring consistency or compatibility between services and
procedures in all cases where joint efforts or close cooperation may be
required and in order to avoid any unnecessary duplication of efforts by
them.
In determining the allocation of responsibilities of the two organizations
to ensure safety of aircraft operations to and from ships and other marine
vehicles, the following principles are applied:
1. All matters which are directly connected with the design,
construction, equipment and operation of aircraft in general, and of
helicopters in particular, should be regarded as falling primarily
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within the field of responsibility of ICAO.
2. All matters which are directly connected with the design,
construction and equipment of ships and other marine vehicles and
their operation should be regarded as falling primarily within the
field of responsibility of IMO.
3. Matters which do not fall clearly within sub-paragraphs 1 and 2
above should be regarded as the responsibility of both organizations
and dealt with by appropriate collaboration between them.
In determining the allocation of responsibilities of the two organizations
in respect of SAR in maritime areas, the following principles are applied:
1. All matters which are directly connected with SAR by aircraft in
general, and with air SAR facilities and operating procedures in
particular, should be regarded as falling primarily within the field of
responsibility of ICAO.
2. All matters which are directly connected with SAR by marine craft in
general, and with marine SAR facilities and operating procedures in
particular should be regarded as falling primarily within the field of
responsibility of IMO.
3. Matters which do not fall clearly within sub-paragraphs 1 and 2
above should be regarded as the responsibility of both organizations
and dealt with by appropriate collaboration between them.
The MOU also provides that any draft amendment to Annex 12 to the
Convention on International Civil Aviation (ICAO, 1975) being considered
by ICAO or any amendment to the Technical Annex to the International
Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (ICAO, 1979) being
considered by IMO and related to matters covered by this MOU will be
communicated by the organization proposing the amendment to the other
organization. Similarly, draft amendments to the ICAO SAR Manual or to
the IMO SAR Manual which are related to matters covered by this MOU
will be communicated in due time to the other organization with a view to
keeping both manuals aligned as closely as possible.
The consultations referred to above should also take place with respect
to matters falling primarily within the responsibility of one or the other
organization, so that each organization may, when it deems it necessary,
safeguard its responsibilities and interests in these matters and thereby
ensure effective cooperative action whether carried out by one or the other
or both organizations.
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In practice, the two Secretariats are required to take all available steps to
ensure that the consultations referred to in paragraph 1 are undertaken
before either organization proceeds to take definitive action on matters
subject to this MOU. The two Secretariats are also expected to make
available to each other relevant information and documentation prepared
for meetings at which matters covered by this MOU are to be considered.
Both Organizations have also agreed to take appropriate steps to ensure
that relevant advice from other organizations and bodies are made available
in matters covered by this MOU, in accordance with the regulations and
procedures of the respective signatory organization.
All the above mentioned documents cited bring to bear the compelling
need for the critical link between the legislative nature of the
documentation and implementation of State responsibility. All the law
making and guidance material, declarations and resolutions would be
destitute of effect if there was no element of State responsibility to give
legitimacy to the instrument by complying with and adhering to the
instruments.
When discussing principles of State responsibility in the field of SAR, it
is an incontrollable fact that the provisions of the Chicago Convention, as
an international treaty, are binding on contracting States to the Convention
and therefore are principles of public international law. The ICJ, in the
North Sea Continental Shelf Case (1970), held that legal principles that are
incorporated in treaties, such as the common interest principle, become
customary international law by virtue of Article 38 of the 1969 Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (United Nations General Assembly,
1969). Article 38 recognizes that a rule set forth in a treaty would become
binding upon a third State as a customary rule of international law if it is
generally recognized by the States concerned as such. Obligations arising
from jus cogens are considered applicable erga omnes which would mean
that States using space technology owe a duty of care to the world at large
in the provision of such technology. The ICJ (1974) in the Barcelona
Traction Case held:
[A]n essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State
towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis a vis
another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the
former are the concerns of all States. In view of the importance of the rights
involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they
are obligations erga omnes. (p. 269-270)
The International Law Commission (1976) has observed of the ICJ
decision:
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[I]n the Courts view, there are in fact a number, albeit limited, of international
obligations which, by reason of their importance to the international
community as a whole, are—unlike others—obligations in respect of which
all States have legal interest. (p. 29)
The views of the ICJ and the International Law Commission, which has
supported the approach taken by the ICJ, give rise to two possible
conclusions relating to jus cogens and its resultant obligations erga omnes:
a) obligations erga omnes affect all States and thus cannot be made
inapplicable to a State or group of States by an exclusive clause in a treaty
or other document reflecting legal obligations without the consent of the
international community as a whole; and b) obligations erga omnes pre-
empt other obligations which may be incompatible with them.
Some examples of obligations erga omnes cited by the ICJ are
prohibition of acts of aggression, genocide, slavery and discrimination. It is
indeed worthy of note that all these obligations are derivatives of norms
which are jus cogens in international law.
International responsibility relates both to breaches of treaty provisions
and other breaches of legal duty. In the Spanish Zone of Morocco Claims
case, Justice Huber observed, “Responsibility is the necessary corollary of
a right. All rights of an international character involve international
responsibility. If the obligation in question is not met, responsibility entails
the duty to make reparation” (RIAA, 1925, p. 641).
It is also now recognized as a principle of international law that the
breach of a duty involves an obligation to make reparation appropriately
and adequately. This reparation is regarded as the indispensable
complement of a failure to apply a convention and is applied as an
inarticulate premise that need not be stated in the breached convention itself
(Re. Chorzow, 1927). The ICJ affirmed this principle in 1949 in the Corfu
Channel Case by holding that Albania was responsible under international
law to pay compensation to the United Kingdom for not warning that
Albania had laid mines in Albanian waters which caused explosions,
damaging ships belonging to the United Kingdom. Since the treaty law
provisions of liability and the general principles of international law as
discussed complement each other in endorsing the liability of States to
compensate for damage caused by space objects, there is no contention as
to whether in the use of nuclear power sources in outer space, damage
caused by the uses of space objects or use thereof would not go
uncompensated. The rationale for the award of compensation is explicitly
included in Article XII of the Liability Convention which requires that the
person aggrieved or injured should be restored (by the award of
compensation to him) to the condition in which he would have been if the
damage had not occurred. Furthermore, under the principles of
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international law, moral damages based on pain, suffering and humiliation,
as well as on other considerations, are considered recoverable (Christol,
1991).
The sense of international responsibility that the United Nations
ascribed to itself had reached a heady stage at this point, where the role of
international law in international human conduct was perceived to be
primary and above the authority of States. In its Report to the General
Assembly, the International Law Commission (1949) recommended a draft
provision which required that, “Every State has the duty to conduct its
relations with other States in accordance with international law and with
the principle that the sovereignty of each State is subject to the supremacy
of international law” (p. 21).
This principle, which forms a cornerstone of international conduct by
States, provides the basis for strengthening international comity and
regulating the conduct of States both internally—within their
territories—and externally, towards other States. States are effectively
precluded by this principle of pursuing their own interests untrammelled
and with disregard to principles established by international law.
ECONOMIC ISSUES
Economic aspects of SAR operations related to aviation have been on
the agenda of ICAO for a considerable time. At ICAO’s Conference on the
Economics of Airports and Air Navigation Services (ICAO, 2000b) held in
Montreal from 19 to 28 June 2000, the Conference considered that, in 1996
a recommendation had been made by an ICAO Air Navigation Services
Economics Panel, that existing policy be amended to allow for costs of
SAR services performed by establishments other than permanent civil
establishments such as military, to be included in the cost basis for air
navigation services charges. The ICAO Council had not approved the
Panel’s recommendations pending a Secretariat Study of the implications
concerned. A subsequent survey carried out by the ICAO Secretariat of
Contracting States had resulted in only a limited number of responses,
precluding a conclusion as to the wishes of States on this issue. The
Conference therefore agreed that there was a need for follow-up of the
Secretariat Study, as well as information from many States that had not
responded to the survey in the first instance.
The Secretariat drew attention to the humanitarian aspects of SAR
operations where States did not wish to charge for services rendered
spontaneously and on an emergency basis. The Conference noted that
under the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, States
were obligated to render gratuitous assistance to any person in distress and
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that there was no attendant cost-recovery mechanism in SAR in the
maritime field. Based on the above deliberations, the Conference
recommended that ICAO undertake further study as to the position of
States and the implications of amending ICAO policy with regard to
recovery of costs for civil aviation related to SAR services presided by
other than permanent civil establishments (ICAO, 2000b, Recommedation
23). As for further work on the subject, the Conference recommended that
ICAO develop guidance on the establishment of organizations at the
regional level for SAR activities and conduct a study on the establishment
of regional or sub-regional SAR mechanisms and how they might be
funded as regards civil aviation (Recommendation 24).
ICAO’s policies on charges for airports and air navigation services were
revised consequent to the Economics of Airports and Air Navigation
Services Conference in 2000. These policies were published by ICAO in
2001. As a fundamental principle, the Council considers that, where air
navigation services are provided for international use, the providers may
require the users to pay their share of the related costs; at the same time,
international civil aviation should not be asked to meet costs that are not
properly allocable to it. The Council therefore encourages States to
maintain accounts for the air navigation services they provide in a manner
which ensures that air navigation services charges levied on international
civil aviation are properly cost-based.
The Council also considers that an equitable cost recovery system could
proceed from an accounting of total air navigation services costs incurred
on behalf of aeronautical users, to an allocation of these costs among
categories of users, and finally to the development of a charging or pricing
policy system. In determining the total costs to be paid for by charges on
international air services, the list in Appendix 2 of ICAO document 9082/6
(ICAO, 2001) may serve as a general guide to the facilities and services to
be taken into account. Guidance on accounting contained in the Airport
Economics Manual (ICAO, 1991) and the Manual on Air Navigation
Services Economics (ICAO, 1997) may be found useful in this general
context. Moreover, the Council specifically recommends that States
consider the application, where appropriate, of internationally accepted
accounting standards for providers of air navigation services that maintain
separate accounts.
It is recommended that, when establishing the cost basis for air
navigation services charges, the cost to be shared is the full cost of
providing the air navigation services, including appropriate amounts for
cost of capital and depreciation of assets, as well as the costs of
maintenance, operation, management and administration. The costs to be
taken into account should be those assessed in relation to the facilities and
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services, including satellite services, provided for and implemented under
the ICAO Regional Air Navigation Plan(s), supplemented where necessary
pursuant to recommendations made by the relevant ICAO Regional Air
Navigation Meeting, as approved by the Council. Any other facilities and
services, unless provided at the request of operators, should be excluded, as
should the cost of facilities or services provided on contract or by the
carriers themselves, as well as any excessive construction, operation, or
maintenance expenditures. The cost of air navigation services provided
during the approach and aerodrome phase of aircraft operations should be
identified separately, and so should the costs of providing aeronautical
meteorological service, when possible. Air navigation services may
produce sufficient revenues to exceed all direct and indirect operating costs
and so provide for a return on assets (before tax and cost of capital) to
contribute towards necessary capital improvements.
In determining the costs to be recovered from users, government may
choose to recover less than full costs in recognition of local, regional, or
national benefits. It is for each State to decide for itself whether, when, and
at what level any air navigation services charges should be imposed, and it
is recognized that States in developing regions of the world, where
financing the installation and maintenance of air navigation services is
difficult, are particularly justified in asking the international air carriers to
contribute through user charges towards bearing a fair share of the cost of
the services. The approach towards the recovery of full costs should be a
gradual progression.
The Council recommends that the allocation of the costs of air
navigation services among aeronautical users be carried out in a manner
equitable to all users. The proportions of cost attributable to international
civil aviation and other utilization of the facilities and services (including
domestic civil aviation, State or other exempted aircraft, and non-
aeronautical users) should be determined in such a way as to ensure that no
users are burdened with costs not properly allocable to them according to
sound accounting principles. The Council also recommends that States
should acquire basic utilization data in respect of air navigation services,
including the number of flights by category of user (i.e., air transport,
general aviation, and other) in both domestic and international operations,
and other data such as the distance flown and aircraft type or weight, where
such information is relevant to the allocation of costs and the cost recovery
system. Guidance on cost allocation is contained in the Manual on Air
Navigation Services Economics (ICAO, 1997), and the Airport Economics
Manual (ICAO, 1991), although States may use any accounting approach
they consider meets their particular requirements.
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The Council further recommends that States should ensure that systems
used for charging for air navigation services are established so that any
charging system should, so far as possible, be simple, equitable and, with
regard to route air navigation services charges, suitable for general
application at least on a regional basis. The administrative cost of collecting
charges should not exceed a reasonable proportion of the charges collected.
The charges should not be imposed in such a way as to discourage the use
of facilities and services necessary for safety or the introduction of new aids
and techniques. The facilities or services provided for in the ICAO
Regional Air Navigation Plan(s) or in any recommendations of the relevant
ICAO Regional Air Navigation Meeting as are approved by the Council
are, however, considered to be necessary for general safety and efficiency.
Charges should be determined on the basis of sound accounting principles
and may reflect, as required, other economic principles, provided that these
are in conformity with Article 15 of the Convention on International Civil
Aviation (ICAO, 2000a) and other principles in this document. The system
of charges must be non-discriminatory both between foreign users and
those having the nationality of the State or States responsible for providing
the air navigation services and engaged in similar international operations,
and between two or more foreign users. Where any preferential charges,
special rebates, or other kinds of reduction in charges normally payable in
respect of air navigation services are extended to particular categories of
users, governments should ensure, so far as practical, that any resultant
under-recovery of costs properly allocable to the users concerned is not
shouldered onto other users. Any charging system should take into account
the cost of providing air navigation services and the effectiveness of the
services rendered. The charging system should be introduced in such
fashion as to take account of the economic and financial situation of the
users directly affected, on the one hand, and that of the provider State or
States, on the other. Charges should be levied in such a way that no facility
or service is charged twice with respect to the same utilization. In cases
where certain facilities or services have a dual utilization (e.g., approach
and aerodrome control, as well as en-route air traffic control) their cost
should be equitably distributed in the charges concerned. The charges
levied on international general aviation should be assessed in a reasonable
manner, having regard to the cost of the facilities needed and used and the




SAR operations conducted gratuitously and with the intent to save
human lives and property are what legal commentators call humanitarian
intervention, which is considered to be a basic moral response of one
human being to another, to save the latter’s life. One definition identifies
“humanitarian intervention as the proportionate transboundary help, including
forcible help, provided by governments to individuals in another [S]tate who
are being denied basic human rights and who themselves would be rationally
willing to revolt against their oppressive government” (Teson, 1956, p. 5).
The general principle of intervention for the provision of relief on moral
grounds has been subject to a great degree of intellectual polarization. One
view is that if humans are dying, one has got to help at all costs (Lillich,
1973). The other is that the mere act of treating humanitarian intervention
as an extant legal doctrine would be to erode the applicable provision of the
United Nations Charter on recourse to force.
The principle of non-intervention has been strongly espoused in order
that sovereignty of a State is retained as sacrosanct. This view is
substantiated by the following argument (Hall, 1924; Lawrence, 1923;
Scott, 1916):
1. The good Samaritan must fight for the right to perform his act of
humanitarian intervention and may end up causing more injury than
he averts;
2. The authorization for forceful and unilateral humanitarian assistance
may be abused; and,
3. Unilateral recourse to force even for genuinely humanitarian
purposes may heighten expectations of violence within the
international system and concomitantly erode the psychological
constraints on the use of force for other purposes.
The essence of intervention is compulsion. Compulsion could either
take place through the use of force, armed or otherwise. The legal question,
with regard to the inviolability of the sovereignty of a State is not whether
the intervention concerned was an armed or unarmed one, but whether it
was effected unilaterally under compulsion or threat by the intervening
State (deLima, 1971). Starke (1977) is inclined to stretch the principle of
sovereignty to accommodate external involvement by a State in the affairs
of another in special circumstances:
…“Sovereignty” has a much more restricted meaning today than in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when, with the emergence of powerful
highly nationalised States, few limits on State autonomy were acknowledged.
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At the present time there is hardly a State which, in the interests of the
international community, has not accepted restrictions on its liberty of action.
Thus most States are members of the United Nations and the International
Labour Organization (ILO), in relation to which they have undertaken
obligations limiting their unfettered discretion in matters of international
policy. Therefore, it is probably more accurate today to say that the
sovereignty of a State means the residuum of power which it possesses within
the confines laid down by international law. It is of interest to note that this
conception resembles the doctrine of early writers on international, law, who
treated the State as subordinate to the law of nations, then identified as part of
the wider “law of nature.” (p. 106)
Oppenheim (1955) holds a similar view that the traditional law of
humanity is incorporated into contemporary international law. He views
this attitude as, “Recognition of the supremacy of the law of humanity over
the law of the sovereign State when enacted or applied in violation of
human rights in a manner that may justly be held to shock the conscience of
mankind” (p. 312). Some authorities in international law also believe that
intervention should, if absolutely necessary, be effected when there is
cogent evidence of a breakdown in the minimum guarantees of humanity
(Hall, 1924, Hyde, 1945; Lawrence, 1923; Stowell, 1921; Wehberg, 1938).
Accordingly, it may be argued that any act of intervention aimed at
saving the lives of human beings which are in danger, would be legally and
morally justifiable. Fernando Teson (1956) argues that since the ultimate
justification for the existence of States is the protection and enforcement of
the natural rights of the citizens, a government that engages in substantial
violations of human rights betrays the very purpose for which it exists and
so forfeits not only its domestic legitimacy, but also its international
legitimacy as well. He goes on to say:
I suggest that from an ethical standpoint, the rights of States under
international law are properly derived from individual rights. I therefore reject
the notion that States have any autonomous moral standing—that they hold
international rights that are independent from the rights of individuals who
populate the State. (p. 15)
Schwarzenberger (1971) analyses the concept somewhat clinically and
concludes that in the absence of an international jus cogens which
corresponds to municipal jus cogens of advanced communities, where the
latter prevents the worst excesses of inequality of power, the supremacy of
the rule of force would prevail.
There is also a contrasting view that humanitarian intervention is
generally resorted to by States only in instances of serious abuses of human
rights by one State upon its people or others. Dr. Michael Akehurst (1977)
argues that if a State intervenes forcibly on the territory of another in order
to protect the local population from serious human violations, such an
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armed intervention could inevitably constitute a temporary violation de
facto of the territorial integrity of the latter State, and to an extent of its
political independence, if carried out against its wishes. Akehurst (1984)
goes on to assert, “Any humanitarian intervention, however limited,
constitutes a temporary violation of the target State’s political
independence and territorial integrity if it is carried out against the State’s
wishes” (p. 105).
The doctrine of humanitarian intervention is thought of by some
commentators as an invention of strategy to circumvent the strong jus
cogens nature of the principle of sovereignty and inviolability of States to
which Dr. Akehurst refers. Professor Brownlie (1963) is of the view that
States have generally invoked the doctrine to give support to their
commercial and strategic considerations. The United Kingdom legislature
recently considered the view of the British Minister of State who was of the
view, “When members of the United Nations act in a forcible manner either
they should do so within and under the authority of the United Nations or
that which they do should be authorised by the principles of international
law” (Hansard, 1993, col. 784).
Clearly, this statement establishes the view that international law in the
context of intervention is jus cogens. The British Foreign Office has
supported this position in the following language:
The best case that can be made in support of humanitarian intervention is that
it cannot be said to be unambiguously illegal…but the overwhelming majority
of contemporary legal opinion comes down against the existence of a right of
humanitarian intervention. (UKMIL, 1986, p. 619)
Despite this strong alignment towards anti-humanitarian intervention, it
is believed that there is a school of thought within the British legislature
that is prepared to accept unilateral intervention as justifiable under
customary international law in cases of extreme humanitarian need (Lowe
& Warbrick, 1993).
The author supports the view that despite these divergent views, the non-
intervention principle remains sacrosanct as a contemporary postulate of
international law and deviations from the principle, although recognized as
ethical and moral in certain instances by scholars, would be justified only in
extreme cases (Vincent, 1974).
CONCLUSION
The essence of SAR operations in aviation is cooperation, which is
embodied as a fundamental principle in the Preamble to the Chicago
Convention which states, inter alia, that it is desirable to avoid friction and
to promote that cooperation between nations and peoples upon which the
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peace of the world depends. At the root of international cooperation is the
element of assistance, and in this sense the maritime regulations which
admit of gratuitous help are both significant and laudable. Although it is not
the intention of this paper to recommend that all SAR operations be
gratuitous, it certainly behoves the community of States to encourage all
States who are in a position to give assistance without charge, to do so.
Humanitarian assistance is an integral element of diplomatic unity and co-
existence.
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STRATEGIC CLASSIFICATION AND
EXAMINATION OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF
CURRENT AIRLINE ALLIANCE ACTIVITIES
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Southern Cross University
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ABSTRACT
Previous research argues that despite the fact that strategic alliances have become an
important feature of the world airline industry, little rigorous analysis has been done
on the effects of these alliances. This is partially because there is a lack of precise
definitions to specify different types of airline alliances in the literature. This research
identifies several categories of airline alliances through a strategic classification of
the current alliance activities involving the major airlines for the period 1989 to 1999.
The classification enables this research to examine how strategic alliance activities
are evolving, particularly to compare how airlines in North America, the European
Union and the Asia Pacific region have committed to different alliances. Findings
show that there is a significant difference between the number and scope of alliances
adopted in the three aviation markets. These findings facilitate research to further
analyse the impact of market liberalization on various formations of strategic airline
alliances.
BACKGROUND
In the 20th century, companies have experienced changes in a diverse
environment, including the shake-up of the social structure, economic
progress and technological advances (Limerick & Cunnington, 1993). The
social structural evolution resulted in dismantled hierarchical cultures
within industries. The economic changes resulted in a change of lifestyle
patterns and increased consumption (Goeldner, 1992). The technological
changes have lifted the industrial society into an information society
(Limerick & Cunnington). The progress of information technology has
allowed communication, research and development, rapid fund transfer and
business coordination through the global network. These social, economic
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and technological changes are paving a way for organizational
globalization. Facing this changing environment, most industries have
adopted various management strategies. Strategic alliances have been
employed as one of these management strategies.
Enterprises pursue alliances for the purposes of being able to cultivate
multinational markets, save time in learning curves, share resources and
manage risks, gain global brand reputations, and develop economies of
scale and scope. In line with an increasing number of enterprises entering
strategic alliances, various approaches to strategic alliances have also
appeared in the current literature. These approaches can be viewed from
generally three perspectives: geographical scope (see Byttebier &
Verroken, 1995; Dussauge & Garrette, 1995), fundamental alliances (see
Pucik, 1998; Kanter, 1989), and hierarchical ranges (see Faulkner, 1995;
Pucik; Robinson & Clarke-Hill, 1994). The concepts of these perspectives
are shown in Figure 1, and discussed briefly below.
The geographical perspective studies strategic alliances in terms of
collaboration, consortia, and bi-national groups (Byttebier & Verroken,
1995; Dussauge & Garrette, 1995). The fundamental studies, for instance
those by Pucik (1998) and Kanter (1989), review strategic alliances in
terms of joint ventures, technology change, licensing, cross-distribution,
and coproduction. In turn, hierarchical ranges, in terms of Faulkner (1995),
Pucik (1998), and Robinson and Clarke-Hill (1994,) emphasize the levels
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Figure 1. Major perspectives of study strategic alliances in the current literature
of cooperation in an alliance such as simple coordination or complex
alliances in nature and features. The simpler forms of alliances can be seen
as more focused alliances such as research and development or sharing
resources. The more complex forms refer to more integrative alliances,
which may involve equity investments and various higher levels of
coordination, joint manufacturing, cross distribution of products, and
cross-licensing.
Despite the two economic depressions due to the Gulf War during 1990,
and the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the airline industry has experienced
several growth periods (Wang, Pendse & Prosser, 1998). Meanwhile it has
been seen that it is not just the number of alliances that has increased in the
last decade; there are also various types of alliances emerging (Wang &
Evans, 2001). The term airline alliance has been used to describe an accord,
partnership, cooperative agreement, joint operation, marketing alliance or
code sharing agreement (IC, 1997). The strategic alliances forged in air
transport markets also include intercontinental alliances (Oum & Taylor,
1995). Intercontinental alliances are the largest and fastest growing type of
international alliance. An across border alliance crosses geographical areas
like Asia Pacific, Europe and North America continents through activities
like code sharing. Their aim is to expand operations abroad.
In 1992, the US started to pursue the potential of bilateral open skies
agreements. The most significant progress in airline alliances was on
January 11, 1993, when the US Department of Transportation approved the
Northwest/KLM commercial cooperation and integration agreement under
a grant of antitrust immunity. KLM and Northwest were since then free to
join together in creating a unified global airline system. The
Northwest/KLM’s commercial cooperation and integration agreement,
under a grant of antitrust immunity showed an entirely new level of
cooperation between the two carriers in air services.
From 1993, both joint activities and marketing alliances made progress.
Some carriers created frequent flier programs (FFPs), and joined together
to handle ground service through joint services and marketing, sharing
capacity and joint operation of FFPs. In 1994, airline alliances moved
towards a stage of multilateral air transport alliance, such as single-skies
agreement, air transport liberalization (open skies), multilateral aviation
rights, and cooperative agreements. From 1995, airline alliances stepped
further towards regional aviation blocs, blocking space agreements, and
open skies agreements However, the US had to take its air service
agreement negotiations as hard-ball bilateral liberalization, recognized by
the US Department of Transportation, due to the market situation and hence
different attitudes towards open skies between Asian, European and North
American carriers (Airline Business, 1998).
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Critically, the five major alliance sectors emerged in the airline industry
in 1996, after the spate of alliance-building activities started from 1994.
The Star Alliance was formally established in 1997, and followed by
oneworld in 1998, in the mean time more airlines entered these two global
alliances or other global groupings (Oum, Park & Zhang, 2000). While
more dynamic airline alliances are emerging, there are more memorandums
of understanding signed between countries, which enabled operating the
Fifth and Seventh Freedom Rights1 of Air, and some even included
agreements of domestic flights (cabotage).
What follows is a consideration of the influential features of alliances
adopted in the air transport markets, and how airlines are involved in
different forms of alliances. Answers to these questions enable researcher
to further examine the effects of airline alliances on airline performance. In
attempting to address these general questions, several problems are
identified.
Research Problems
There are increasing numbers of airlines entering alliances and
increasing levels of involvement in the alliances. However, the effects of
strategic alliances on firm performance and on industry organization have
received relatively less attention from academics (Oum, Park & Zhang,
2000). The general alliance research in previous studies mostly discusses
functions and motivations of strategic alliances (e.g., Varadarajan &
Cunningham, 1995; Vyas, Shelburn & Rogers, 1995). Some of the studies
just describe how to choose partners (e.g., Brouthers, Brouthers &
Wilkinson, 1995). In the airline industry, some of the studies examined
airline routes or network systems. The several studies that have examined
airline alliances are mainly focused on code share or airline alliances in
general. Very few studies have examined the effects of joint activities and
marketing alliances. More critically, most of the studies have not controlled
for industry specific effects and specific alliance effects (Park, 1997; Park
& Cho, 1997). Airlines exercise different tactics on different routes thus
different levels of cooperation may have different degrees of effects.
In aiming to examine effects of alliance alliances, this research
confronts another problem which is a lack of clear definitions of the
alliances in the current literature, possibly resulting from the complex
features and the changing tactics of airline alliances (Wang & Evans, 2001).
For example, the equity alliance (Jennings, 1990) between Singapore,
Delta and Swissair formed in 1990 was an agreement for the coordination
of international fares and flight schedules, the loaning of flight attendants
and opening the possibility of joint buying opportunities. This alliance
encompassed the same characteristics of today’s global grouping of Star
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Alliance or oneworld. It was reported as an equity alliance (Jennings), but,
in fact, has no equity swaps. On the other hand, the alliance between British
Airways and United, similar to Singapore/Delta/Swissair alliance included
schedule coordination and code sharing of international flights, and was
called a marketing alliance (Jennings).
The route-specific agreement between the airlines of Garuda of
Indonesia and Japan Airline is also called a strong marketing alliance by
Garuda. However, Japan Airline officials have trouble remembering the
agreement exists (Jennings, 1990). This alliance is actually a route-specific
agreement. Similarly, in 1990 Alitalia and Iberia signed an agreement to
provide each other reciprocal access to their Southeast Asian and Central
American networks. The nature of the agreement shows that this deal is a
bilateral agreement on route specific services, but it is called a natural
collaboration in their business reports (see Whitaker, 1990).
Similar to the US open skies, the Andean countries’ alliances are also
called open skies. In mid-May 1991, all of a sudden, more skies over the
Andes were opened (Booth, 1991). In 1993, the presidents of the five
Andean countries—Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela—
signed an agreement, to set up an open skies regime. In 1994, Malaysia,
Indonesia and Thailand forged a regional bloc called the Northern Growth
Triangle (Hooper, 1997). This regional alliance has later stemmed out the
idea of open clubs, approached by some researchers and airline business
experts. It thus can be questioned whether all these liberal forms of
alliances should be considered in the studies of effects of the integrative
alliances in the airline industry.
Code share also varies in terms of concepts and agreements. There are
different agreements within code share alliances such as parallel and
complementary alliances (Park, 1997). Code share, according to the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO, 1997) are block space
arrangements, which occur when a number of passenger seats and/or
specified cargo space are purchased by an air carrier for the carriage of its
traffic on an aircraft of a second air carrier. The code share between Air
Canada and All Nippon Airways is an agreement on only the limited flights
between the routes of Osaka-Vancouver and Tokyo-Toronto (Airline
Alliance Survey, 1999). However, the code share between Air Canada and
United entails the comprehensive code share agreements on several
hundred flights, including joint marketing, one-stop check-in and lounge
access. Thus, it can be questioned whether partners involved in simple code
sharing benefit in the same way as partners entering comprehensive code
sharing. Thus, to what extent does the term code share apply?
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The problems discussed above show airline alliance activities are
complex in features and forms. There is, however, no clear definition or
specific terminology of these alliances. This problem confuses research
and observation in airline alliance studies, and may have partly contributed
to the limited studies in the current literature that have examined the effects
of airline strategic alliances. The five emerging Global Alliances, started in
1996, have already accounted for 57.1% of the world total revenue
passenger kilometers, and share more than 59.0% of the world total
operation revenue of the airline industry by 1999 (Airline Business, 1999).
Thus, it is important to study airline alliances, and hence the effects of the
different types of airline alliances.
Importantly, the stages of market liberalization between North America
(NA), the European Union (EU) and the Asia Pacific (AP) region AP may
have affected the progress of the airlines entering strategic alliances. It has
been argued that the US has been moving towards open skies while most of
the markets in the AP region are still regulated with only a few AP airlines
invited to enter the open skies (Eleck, Findlay, Hooper & Warren, 1999;
Hooper & Findlay, 1998; PC 1998).
The problems indicated above are the background of this research’s
central issues:
Research Issue 1: What are the features and patterns of the development
of airline alliances in the air transport markets?
Research Issue 2: Is a significant difference among airlines’ formation
of alliances in North American, the European Union and the Asia
Pacific region?
STRATEGIC CLASSIFICATION OF AIRLINE ALLIANCES
This part of the study examines the concepts of different types of airline
alliances while attempting to create a framework for strategic classification
of the airline alliances. As airline alliances vary in features and areas of
cooperation, the classification is important, enabling research further
examining the development of airline alliances and their consequences.
Route Specific Services
During the period of 1989 to 1999, international airlines launched
numerous route specific services negotiated under bilateral Air Service
Rights (ASRs). It therefore is important to know how the new route-
specific agreements, coexisting with other types of alliances, contribute to
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airline performance. Thus, the bilateral route specific services are classified
as Type One Alliances, suggesting a simple and basic form of airline
alliance agreements.
Since the 1944 Chicago Convention, all commercial aspects of
international air transport have been governed by bilateral air service
agreements (ASAs). Each international airline faces a complex web of
ASAs signed by its home state (Oum & Yu, 1997). ASRs are a product of a
complex global network of ASAs that guarantee the scheduled and non-
scheduled (charter) airlines certain traffic freedoms (PC, 1998). Currently
ASAs are based on the principle of reciprocity, an equal and fair exchange
of rights between countries.
The route specific services examined by this research refer to the
agreements based on bilateral traffic rights between countries. Although
the agreements vary in form, they generally specify services and routes to
be operated between the two countries’ designated airlines and the capacity
to be provided by each airline (Oum & Yu, 1997; Rimmer, 1997). The
agreements offer carriers access to entry and hence enable carriers to
operate flight services across country borders within the limits the rights
permit. The bilateral services may also include services beyond these
limits. For example, Air Canada launched a weekly Toronto-Berlin/
Schonefeld route, using fifth freedom rights from Paris.
Code Sharing
Code sharing has become a popular form of airline alliance. Code share
is classified as Type Two Alliances in this research. Code share, compared
with the route specific services, is a step forward in the progress of alliance
development in terms of the alliance features. Code share provides
cooperation between carriers other than just providing access for city-pairs
or non-stop flights. Under code share, the agreements often involve one
airline buying blocks of seats on the other airline’s flights and reselling
them (GAO, 1995). Under a code sharing agreement, one partner (the code
sharing partner) assigns its airline designator a code to the flight of its
partner (the operating carrier) (ICAO, 1997).
A block of seats agreement can be negotiated with the number of seats
available to the code-sharing partner determined upfront. The most
complex alliances operate sophisticated computerized seat management
systems that allow both partners to manage the capacity effectively on a
seat-by-seat basis on a particular route, on a range of flights within a region,
or on a global basis coordinating activities over many countries (BTCE,
1996).
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An example of code share is the Canadian and Qantas alliance.
Canadian and Qantas have a code sharing agreement on the Vancouver-
Honolulu-Sydney route where Canadian serves the Vancouver-Honolulu
section and Qantas serves Honolulu-Sydney section of the route (OAG,
1999). Code share alliances enable a participating carrier to enter thin
markets that it would not otherwise serve profitably on its own. For
example, Qantas formed a code sharing alliance with Air Vanuatu on the
Australia/Vanuatu route, as load factors would not be viable if it introduced
its own aircraft onto the route (BTCE, 1996)
Parallel and complementary alliances in nature are also code share
alliances. Parallel operation of flight service refers to the coordination in
competing routes or the same route (Park & Zhang, 1998). For example,
between Vancouver, Canada and Sydney, Australia a code share service is
offered under either Canada or Qantas. This service is actually operated by
Canada between Vancouver and Honolulu and by Qantas between
Honolulu and Sydney (ICAO, 1997).
Complementary code sharing is an alliance on different routes rather
than parallel routes. According to Park and Zhang (1998), a complementary
alliance is the case where two firms link their existing networks and build a
new complementary alliance network in order to feed traffic to each other.
According to the Industry Commission (IC, 1997), complementary code
sharing is when two airlines code share on different, but connecting routes,
usually to feed traffic between two sectors.
Typically code sharing is accompanied by a suite of other coordinated
services designed to provide passengers with smooth connections between
flights operated by the partner carriers (ICAO, 1997). On-line service
belongs to the category of code share. On-line service refers to enabling
passengers to fly by one airline on behalf of another airline based on a
formal alliance arrangement between the two airlines. Interline service
refers to customers flying or using transport services of more than one
airline (ICAO). On-line service agreements are generally aimed at
facilitating international passenger movements, as without an alliance
agreement, passengers have to fly on an airline other than the one identified
on the ticket (ICAO). On-line services also allow partners to provide more
alternatives in destination choices through their expanded networks, which
offer more convenient itineraries to passengers (Park, 1997).
Joint Activities
If a code share agreement is multiple cooperation in nature, it can be
regarded as a Type Three Alliance. In Type Three Alliances, the cooperation
is no longer limited to just exchanging designation code or buying a block
of seats but involving multiple cooperation of ground services. The current
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literature shows that various airline alliances are mixed together under
equity or joint operations. This research aims to separate alliances having
only code share or block space sales from those with multiple areas of joint
activities including the coordination of ground handling, joint use of
ground facilities, coordination of flight schedules, joint maintenance,
purchase of aircraft and fuel and staff training. Creating connection
services is also a potential joint activity. Connection services normally
involve the coordination of baggage checks and honouring of tickets
between airlines, but the identity of each carrier is maintained (ICAO,
1997).
Marketing Alliances
Marketing alliances include the global groupings. The five emerging
global, marketing alliances appeared in the global air transport market from
late 1996 to 1999. These five alliances are the Star, Qualiflyer (or
Excellence), oneworld, Northwest/KLM (or Global Wings) and Air
France/Delta (Airline Business, 1999). These groups of global alliances are
defined in Table 1.
Star Alliance brought together eight carriers in 1997, and was joined by
Ansett Australian and Air New Zealand in 1999. The Singapore and
Lufthansa alliance was formed on November 24, 1997 and, by the end of
1999, Singapore also became a member of the Star Alliance. All Nippon
Airways joined the group in October 1999 (Airline Business, 1998; 1999).
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AIR GLOBAL STAR
FRANCE/DELTA WINGS ONEWORLD ALLIANCE QUALIFLYER
Delta Airlines Northwest American United Airlines Swissair
Airlines
Air France KLM British Airways Lufthansa Sabena
Aeromexico Continental Qantas Airline Canada Thy Turkish
Austrain Alitalia Cathay Pacific Thai Tap Air
International
Korean Air Malaysia Canadian SAS AOM
Iberia Varig Lauda Air
Finnair Air New Zealand Crossair
Lanshile Ansett Australia Air Europe
All Nippon
Singapore
Table 1. The emerging global alliance groupings
Note: From Airline Alliance Survey. Airline Business Special Issue July 1999, pp. 39-65.
By 1999 the Star Alliance network covered more than 760 destinations and
112 countries. The alliance allows access to over 250 Star Alliance lounges
around the world, reciprocal FFPs participation and recognition, through
check-in, streamlined airport operations, cargo cooperation, joint
purchasing, advertising and promotions (Airline Business, 1999).
The formation of oneworld in 1998 was presented as a brand name for a
global network. Finnair and Iberia joined the group in September 1999, and
Lan Chile became a member of the group in 2000. A third major global
group, Global Wings, has coalesced around KLM and Northwest who
formed an alliance in 1989, later joined by Continental Airlines, and
Malaysian Airlines, who both signed the Joint Venture Agreements in
1999. In November 1998, Alitalia and KLM announced the Master
Cooperation Agreement, and since November 1999 Alitalia became a
member of the group (Airline Business, 1999).
European Quality Alliance (Qualiflyer), which started in 1994, includes
Swissair, Austrian, and SAS. In 1995, however, SAS faced three
alternatives: alliances with Lufthansa, KLM or British Airways. In 1997,
SAS joined Star Alliance and Austrian joined the Air France/Delta group.
According to Airline Business (1999) this group currently also has seven
other European Airlines as members. The last sector, according to Oum,
Park and Zhang (2000) refers to the Air France and Delta group (see also
Airline Business, 1999).
Marketing alliances are aimed at marketing passenger services and
creating customer satisfaction through various cooperative operations.
These types of alliance often involve high integration and coordination of
flights, scheduling, advertising and FFPs (GAO, 1995). For example, FFPs
enable passenger to accrue frequent flier miles on their home carrier’s plans
even if they fly on a partner’s flight and also permit them to use FFPs
rewards on each other’s flights (Oum, Park & Zhang, 2000). The alliances
are easier for travellers to accumulate mileage because the alliance network
serves more cities than does a single carrier (IC, 1997; Oum, Park &
Zhang). These types of alliance have the key characteristics of cooperation
in the marketing field.
Some international airlines have entered regional groupings prior to
global marketing alliances. These regional blocs have agreements covering
the same areas of cooperation and hence can be regarded as marketing
alliances.
Sharing the Computer Reservation System (CRS) is also part of the
activities of marketing alliances. Alliance partners can obtain competitive
advantages over non-aligned competitors on the CRS display. Travel agents
use the CRS of major international airlines and these airlines have entered
into alliances. A code shared non-stop flight is listed twice in the CRS
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because each partners places their individual code of the same flight on the
system (Park, 1997). The same service using different airline designation
codes and flight numbers may appear a great number of times, due to code
sharing services (ICAO, 1997). Thus, the alliances for sharing the CRS
enable airlines to obtain marketing advantages.
Generally, marketing alliances aim to offer better service quality, more
advantages through the larger networks, more destinations available,
flexible tickets, and bonus points. Marketing alliances, also through global
grouping, share the CRS, offer FFPs, and coordinate other passenger
services.
Open Skies
In 1992, the US adopted an open skies regime and came to pursue a more
liberal form of alliances in world air transport markets. The
Northwest/KLM alliance started in 1989 (Airline Alliance Survey, 1999;
2000) is an example of open skies in that partners have long-haul code
sharing and a comprehensive marketing agreement, on the North Atlantic,
in the US, Europe, Africa and the Middle East. They also have joint FFPs.
They cooperate on ground handling, sales, catering information
technology, cargo and maintenance, and joint purchasing (Alliance Survey
in Airline Business, 1999). These can show some characteristics of the
broad commercial alliances under the open skies.
In 1993, the US Department of Transportation granted anti-trust
immunity to the alliance between Northwest and KLM, which allows the
airlines from both countries unrestricted entry and capacity rights between
and beyond both countries (PC, 1998). This permitted the airlines to
conduct extensive code sharing and to jointly market capacity and
determine fares without fear of legal challenge from the competing airlines
(IC, 1997). This shows another characteristic of open skies—broad
commercial alliances.
American Airlines and Canadian also signed a broad commercial
agreement under the US open skies regime. This alliance also provides
Canadian with a range of services including accounting, data processing
and communications, operations planing, pricing and yield management,
international services, passenger services training and US originated
reservations (Airline Alliance Survey, 1999). American Airlines also
invested $190 million in Canadian for 25 percent of Canadian’s voting
shares and 8.99 percent of its convertible preferred shares (Park, 1997).
This shows another feature of broad commercial alliances under open
skies.
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According to the open skies policy outlined in Appendix A the broad
commercial alliances show the removal of restrictions on the ability of
airlines to operate services between two countries. Normally, the
memorandum of understanding includes code share agreements on
international and domestic flights, reciprocal FFPs, lounge access, through
check-in, integration of boarding procedures, computer reservation system
linkage, joint marketing and sales programs.
The regional blocs or open club in the AP region and the open skies in
the five Andean countries also show the characteristics of broad
commercial alliances. The five Andean countries’ open skies include
partners of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela who signed an
agreement in 1993. However, the alliance between Cathay Pacific/South
African Airways formed in 1998 belongs to marketing alliances, as the
memorandum of understanding leads only to a code share agreement,
FFPs, and ground handling. Compared with other types of alliance, broad
commercial alliances under open skies in general are more liberal in areas
of cooperation and dynamic in features.
Summary of the Classification and Research Questions
In the above analysis, the current airline alliances are identified as the
five major categories: bilateral route specific services; code share; joint
activities; marketing alliances; and broad commercial alliances (open
skies). This classification system is based on systematic observation of
airline alliance activities and supported by the concepts of the theoretical
studies by the information papers and academic research. A framework of
the strategic classification is provided in Appendix B.
This theoretical examination enables the researcher to further explore
how each type of alliance activities increases in the airline industry, and
particularly in the three aviation markets: NA, the EU, and the AP region. It
also investigates how each airline has adopted different alliances. Towards
these objectives, this research develops research questions and hypothesis
as follows:
Question 1: How many strategic alliances have been formed by the
airlines in general from 1989 to 1999?
Question 2: How have the five types of alliances increased from
1989 to 1999?
Question 3: How are the airlines involved in the different types of
alliances from 1989 and 1999
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Question 4: How are the airlines in the three regions of North
America, the European Union and the Asian Pacific region involved
in the five types of alliances from 1989 and 1999?
Hypothesis 1: There is a significant difference in the number and
forms of strategic airline alliances between the three regional
aviation markets.
METHODS
Methods employed for this research are descriptive statistics and
analysis of variance. The research hypothesis involves analysis of variance,
and, hence, ANOVA technique is employed. This enables the comparisons
of the means of numbers and types of airline alliances between the three
groups, and seeks whether there is a significant difference between the
groups based on likelihood ratios (F ratio) obtained. An ANOVA
essentially answers the simple question of whether there are differences
between the groups. This is a path analysis (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996).
The path analysis enables further examination of the critical factors
involved in formation of an airline alliance in future studies.
The samples used for the study are described in Table 2. The 27 major
airlines sampled are the members of the ICAO. These airlines are also the
major international carriers or mostly the flag carriers of the NA, the EU
and the AP region. Importantly, they are where the critical issues were
raised by previous studies, and hence the focus of this research.
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NORTH
AMERICA DESIGN EUROPEAN DESIGN ASIAN DESIGN
AIRLINES CODE AIRLINES CODE AIRLINES CODE
Air Canada AC Air France AF Air India AI
American AA Alitalia AZ Air NZ NZ
Continental CO British Airways BA All Nippon NH
Delta Airlines DL KLM KL Cathay Pacific CX
Northwest NW Lufthansa LH Air China CA
SAS SK Swissair SR Japan Airlines JL
United UA Virgin Atlantic VIR Korean KE
Canadian CDN Malaysia Airlines MH
USAir AL Qantas Airways QF
Singapore SQ
Thai Airways TG
Table 2. Airlines included in the research sample
Focusing on these airlines, the airline alliance data were collected from
Airline Business, including 5,518 monthly issues of electronic journals
from 1989 to 1999. These issues have been accessed on the Internet at the
web site page http://ezproxy.scu.edu.au. Information of global alliances
was gathered from Special Report of Airline Business, July 1999, and July
2000, including the Airline Alliance Survey, the Global Grouping, and
Mergers Revised.
Five type of alliance identified by the theoretical study can be seen in
ordinal ranges (see Table 3). These ranges enable the analysis to separate a
simple alliance from higher levels of cooperation between partners in
examining the effects of the different types of alliances. Another set of
variables used are the three phases, which specify the earlier stage of airline
alliance (Phase 1 from 1989 to1992), the developing stage (Phase 2 from
1992 to 1995) and the developed stage (Phase 3 from 1995 to 1997). These
measures enable the comparison of the development of alliances to be made
between different historical stages. Further, the three regional aviation
markets are the focus of the hypothesis. All these variables are shown in
Table 3.
Normality of the variable is required in estimations done by methods of
maximum likelihood and generalised least squares (Bacon, 1997). The
criteria value for testing the normality is from a z-distribution, based on a
significant level desired (Tabachnick & Litschert, 1994). The data normal
distribution was examined by SPSS Data Exploration, through which
skewness and kurtosis statistics were obtained, and then calculated. The z
score obtained by skewness statistics was further divided by the standard
error. The z sore of kurtosis followed the calculation procedures of
z score = kurtosis statistic / std.error. These z scores were then checked
against the critical ratio desired (z score = – 3.5). A value exceeding – 2.6 is
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VARIABLES SPECIFICATIONS
Types of Alliances Type 1 Bilateral
Type 2 Code share
Type 3 Joint activities
Type 4 Market alliances
Type 5 Open skies
Year indices 1, ...,11 1989-99
Three phases Phase 1 1989-92
Phase 2 1992-95
Phase 3 1995-97
Regional aviation markets i,...,g i„ g NA, EU, AP
Table 3. Measures and variables employed for this research
used as a critical ratio for rejecting the assumption about normality of the
distribution for this research. The results in Table 4 show that all the data
were normal distribution, except open skies, which however, meet the
critical ratio of skewness.
Following the normality test, the analysis is conducted. The next section
reports results of the descriptive studies and hypothesis test.
RESULTS
The following results are from the study of the first question concerning
the number of strategic alliances formed by the airlines in general from
1989 to 1999, as outlined in the theoretical section of theoretical study (see
Table 5).
Results in Table 5 show there were 1,211 alliances in the major air
transport markets between 1989 and 1999. British Airways, American
Airlines, and United Airlines had the largest numbers of alliances between
1989 and 1999, followed by Air Canada, Qantas, Scandinavian Airlines Air
France, Lufthansa and Japan Airlines.
The development of the five types of airline alliance is examined. The
following results are from the examination of how the five types of
alliances have increased from 1989 to 1999. Figure 2 shows that bilateral
services were the fastest developing route services. There were a total
number of 171 new services launched by 1995. However, the growth rates
went down while the international airlines increased agreements under the
US open skies regime and other kinds of cooperation during 1996 and
1999. Code sharing alliances developed at the most rapid speed after 1992.
In 1999 there were a total number of 363 agreements signed by the 27
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KOLMOGOROV-
SMIRNOV SKEWNESS KURTOSIS
Variables Statistic Df Statistic Statistic
(Critical ratio) (Critical ratio)
Bilateral 0.16 286 1.10 0.56
Code share 0.20 286 1.60 2.60
Joint activity 0.17 286 1.40 1.90
Marketing 0.24 286 1.09 1.90
Open skies 0.38 286 2.50 6.70*
Total alliance 0.14 286 1.30 1.60
Table 4. Normality test results for the alliance data
*departs from normal distribution
major international airlines. It hence shows that code share was the most
popular form of alliance between 1989 and 1999.
Joint activities (total number 302) and marketing alliances (total 269)
had a parallel growth pattern since 1996. Marketing alliances became the
third most common alliance among the five types of alliance activities, and
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TOTAL TOTAL
AIRLINE RANK ALLIANCES AIRLINE RANK ALLIANCES
BA 1 89 NZ 15 45
AA 2 81 DL 16 41
UA 3 77 SQ 17 34
QF 5 77 TG 17 33
AC 4 76 MH 18 36
SK 6 69 AZ 19 33
AF 7 62 CA 20 22
LH 8 55 NH 21 25
JAL 9 51 KE 22 22
SR 10 49 AL 23 20
KL 11 46 CDN 24 17
CO 12 45 AI 25 14
CX 13 38 VIR 26 9
NW 14 45 Total 1211
Table 5. Summary of the alliance activities of the airlines, 1989-99
Note: Airlines are ranked based on total number of alliances formed from 1989 to 1999.
Figure 2. Scales of the five types of alliances
increased from 9 in 1992 to 269 by 1999. It was not until 1994 that the
numbers of broader commercial alliances started to increase. However, the
growth was very rapid increasing from 2 in 1992 to 57 in 1999.
Following the study of the development of the five types of airline
alliance, the examination evaluated how each airline was involved in the
different types of alliances.
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Airline Code Joint Marketing Open
Rank Airline Code Bilateral Share Activities (Global) Skies Total
1 BA 8 8 22 29 28 2 89
2 AA 7 9 33 15 20 4 81
3 UA 25 21 20 10 20 6 77
4 QF 20 20 23 20 14 0 77
5 AC 1 18 13 19 24 2 76
6 SK 21 4 15 22 27 1 69
7 AF 2 4 27 11 17 3 62
8 LH 17 3 15 20 16 1 55
9 JAL 14 12 17 18 4 0 51
10 SR 23 2 26 7 11 3 49
11 KL 15 11 13 9 9 4 46
12 CO 11 8 12 8 12 5 45
13 NW 19 20 8 2 9 6 45
14 NZ 4 9 13 14 8 1 45
15 DL 12 6 19 7 6 3 41
16 CX 9 5 5 20 8 0 38
17 MH 18 3 16 13 2 2 36
18 AZ 5 6 13 2 6 6 33
19 SQ 22 8 3 15 4 3 33
20 TG 24 1 4 20 7 0 32
21 NH 6 13 7 4 1 0 25
22 CA 10 9 6 7 1 0 23
23 KE 16 3 16 2 1 0 22
24 AL 26 15 3 0 1 1 20
25 CDN 28 0 6 1 8 2 17
26 AI 3 2 3 7 2 0 14
27 VIR 13 0 5 0 3 1 9
Total 220 363 302 269 57 1211
Table 6. Summary of the type of alliance involvement of the airlines, 1989-99
Results in Table 6 show that during the 11 years, different international
airlines had different concentrations in forming different types of strategic
alliance at different periods of time. British Airways was found to have the
largest number of marketing alliances and joint programs. American
Airlines had the largest number of code share agreements. United, KLM,
Northwest and Alitalia had the largest number of open skies agreements.
USAir was first in the number of bilateral agreements.
The examination of the differences among the three regions focused on
how each market has been involved in alliance activities. Results from the
exploration of the bilateral alliances are shown in Figure 3. The airlines of
the AP region developed the largest number of the bilateral services from
1990 to 1994. NA airlines, however, were faster with the development of
bilateral services after 1993. They reached a total number of 97 alliances by
1999. EU airlines had the smallest number of the new bilateral services
until 1998, when they increased by 76, and became the second largest
market in terms of these activities. The airlines of the AP region increased
the new bilateral services by a larger number between 1990 and 1991. They
were then steady until 1999.
Results for code share activities are shown in Figure 4. The three
markets increased code share activities modestly before 1994. EU airlines
had rapid growth after 1994, with a total number of 85 code share
agreements signed by 1997, followed by NA airlines with 74 agreements.
By 1997, the airlines of the AP region had a smaller number of code share
agreements.
Results for joint activities are shown in Figure 5. The AP region airlines
were leading in the number of the joint activities from 1989 to 1999, with a
total of 109 agreements. This was followed by EU airlines. The number of
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Figure 3. Normal plots-the alliance data
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Figure 4. Summary of the increases of the five types alliance activities of the 27
airlines 1989-1999
Note: a) This figure uses accumulated data of alliances of each year
b) Assessment based on monthly issues and special issues of Airline Business 1989-1999
Figure 5. Summary of the new bilateral services by the three markets
Note: a) 0= data were not available for 1989
b) This figure uses nested data of new bilateral services
b) Assessment based on monthly issues and special issues of Airline Business 1989-1999
joint activities by EU airlines increased rapidly from 1996 to 1997, with
100 agreements signed in 1999. The airlines of NA, on the other hand, had
fewer joint program agreements, with only 62 formed with other
international airlines between 1989 and 1999.
Results from the investigation of the development of marketing alliances
are shown in Figure 6. Before 1991, there were few marketing alliances,
and the activities developed slowly in the markets. However, EU airlines
had a leap in 1992, and increased the number of alliances from 2 to 12. NA
airlines also had rapid progress during that time, and developed from 8
alliances in 1992 to 28 by 1996.
In fact, both NA and EU airlines had increases between 1996 and 1999,
with the total numbers of marketing alliances increased from 59 to 117,
when many airlines joined the Star Alliance and oneworld. On the other
hand, AP region airlines had the smallest number of marketing alliances
between 1989 and 1999, with a total of 32. However, in 1997 they increased
the number of marketing alliances from 9 to 20, and by 1999 eight of the
airlines became members of global alliances.
Results from the exploration of the open skies activities are shown in
Figure 7. From 1994 to 1997, the US signed open skies agreements with 12
NA and EU countries. There were no AP region countries that had entered
the US open skies at that stage. However, in 1994, Malaysia, Indonesia and
Thailand entered a regional bloc, and signed a joint Memorandum of
Understanding. By 1997, a few AP region countries were invited to enter
the US open skies. The trends in Figure 7 show that the US open skies
activities developed rapidly in NA and EU from 1994.
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Figure 6. Summary of the code share Figure 7. Summary of the joint activities
Note: a) These figures use accumulated data of the activities
b) Assessment based on monthly issues and special issues of Airline Business 1989-1999
In addition to the US open skies and Asia regional blocs, there were also
several bilateral open skies agreements signed by the airlines of South
America. Prior to 1991, a bilateral open skies agreement was signed
between Colombia and Venezuela. In mid-May 1991, all of a sudden, more
skies over the Andes were open. The presidents of the five Andean
countries, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela signed an
agreement, to set up an open skies regime by 1993. The agreement was to
create a single aviation market. They also launched deregulation within the
region in December 1991. The Scandinavia region also opened up, which
enabled Norway and Sweden greater competition between their carriers in
the context of negotiations with the European Community on full
participation in the single air transport market.
As the research presumes that there are differences between the number
and types of alliances of the carriers, this presumption is expressed as:
( ) ( )al ali kå å „ ........................... (3.1) i =1,2,3, i „ k










where S (al) stands for the sum total of alliances, subscript i and k is a





is the sum total of one type for the five types of alliances.
The analysis is directed at testing the hypothesis which supposes there is
a significant difference in the number and forms of strategic airline
alliances between the three regional aviation markets. The results in Table 7
shows there was a significant difference in numbers of strategic airline
alliances between the three aviation markets (F = 5.05, df = 2, p < 0.007).
The means showed that NA airlines on average engaged in more alliances
(mean = 5.2) than EU airlines (mean = 4.5), and AP region airlines
(mean = 3.3). The results also show that there was a significant difference
between the three markets in numbers of joint activities (F = 6.2, df = 2,
p < 0.002), marketing alliances (F = 17.4, df = 2, p < 0.000), open skies
agreements (F = 28.5, df = 2, p < 0.000) and route specific services
(F = 12.5, df = 2, p < 0.000). However, there was no significant difference in
the number of code sharing activities between the airlines of NA, the EU
and the AP region. AP region airlines, in fact, forged more numbers of joint
activities than the airlines of the other two markets, as the means shown.
The test results corroborated the descriptive study to support the
hypothesis.
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CONCLUSIONS
The research commenced with an attempt to address the central research
issues:
Research Issue 1: What are the features and patterns of the development
of airline alliances in the air transport markets?
Research Issue 2: Is there a significant difference among airlines’
formation of alliances in North American, the European Union and
the Asia Pacific region?
Four questions were studied towards addressing the research issues.
Findings show that after the economic recession worldwide, different
features of alliance agreements were not just signed by NA and EU airlines
but also took shape in the AP region. Route specific alliances were once a
major form of alliance to enable airlines to access other countries. It was
however regularly replaced by dynamic forms of strategic alliance. Airlines
of the US and the EU increased strategic alliances following deregulation
and liberalization. South American countries, Colombia and Venezuela,
signed the first bilateral open skies agreement in the region. Five Andean
countries set up an open skies regime in 1991, effected in 1993, to create a
single aviation market in South America.
Airline alliances underwent a significant change in 1992, when the US
started to pursue the potential of bilateral open skies agreements. The most
significant progress in airline alliances was on January 11, 1993, when the
US Department of Transportation approved the Northwest/KLM
commercial cooperation and integration agreement under a grant of
antitrust immunity. KLM and Northwest were then free to join together in
creating a unified global airline system.
In 1993, some larger carriers initiated FFPs, and joined together to
handle ground services through cooperation and marketing alliances,
sharing capacity and joint operation of FFPs. In 1994, airline alliances
moved towards a stage of multilateral air transport alliance, such as single-
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Table 7. Difference in alliances between the three markets, 1989-1999
F Df Mean Sig.
Variables NA EU AP region
Annual new alliances 5.05 2 5.2 4.5 3.3 0.007
Route specific (bilateral) 12.5 2 7.8 3.4 5.4 0.000
Code share 2.5 2 5.5 6.1 4.2 0.086
Joint activities 6.2 2 3.5 4.8 6.1 0.002
Marketing 17.4 2 4.5 5.6 1.7 0.000
Open skies 28.5 2 1.1 0.8 0.06 0.000
skies agreements, air transport liberalization (open skies), multilateral
aviation rights, and cooperative agreements. From 1995, airline alliances
moved further towards the creation of regional aviation blocs, blocking
space agreements, and open skies agreements. Critically, five major
alliance sectors emerged in the airline industry in 1996, since the spate of
alliance-building activities started from 1994. The Star Alliance was
formally established in 1997, followed by oneworld in 1998, and more
airlines entered these two global alliances or other global groupings.
This research also tested the hypothesis of whether there are any
significant differences among the three regional aviation markets of NA,
the EU and the AP region. Results show that there is a significant difference
between them regarding the number of alliances entered and the features of
alliances entered. The significant differences are shown in the numbers of
joint activities, marketing alliances, open skies and route specific services.
The results obtained through the multiple examinations agreed with each
other to show that the research hypothesis is supported.
This research shows that the airline industry has developed different
features of alliances in various areas of cooperation. The airline alliances
are similar to, but also different from, the collaboration and consortia of
other industries. The similarities are the nature of collaboration involving
horizontal bi-national groups and consortia engaged by multiple partners of
different countries, such as the Star Alliance and oneworld. The differences
are the complex features, as well as, areas of cooperation. These areas of
cooperation are linked to the characteristics of the airline industry and
hence the motivations of the industry. Findings of this research provide
information for studying the formation of strategic airline alliances.
Findings of this research have implications for the development of
concepts and features of airline alliances, and, hence, contribute to the
strategic airline alliance literature. The strategic classification system
contributes to studying the typology of strategic airline alliance, as little
research has been done to specifically identify or classify current airline
alliances according to their overall nature and features. The five types of
airline alliances range from simple alignments to integrative forms and
these concepts are important for measuring the nature and features of
airline alliances and for examining the development of airline alliances.
The Airline Alliance Survey (1999) has listed the current registered
airlines’ alliances as a total of 856 between 1987 to 2000. This research
recognizes a total of 1,211 alliances by accumulating each year’s new
alliances of the 27 international airlines from 1989 to 1999. This data is
accessed through the researchers’ examination of 5,518 issues of Airline
Business. It needs to be reindicated that this number of alliances includes
bilateral route specific services. It has been acknowledge that more than
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one third of international airline alliances were terminated between 1995
and 1998 (Li, 1999; Oum, 2000). This may further explain the difference
with the numbers obtained by this research and the Airline Alliance Survey
(1999). The data information provided by this research is important for
examining how the numbers and features of strategic airline alliances are
increasing with the liberalization process, regulatory policy, and economic
factors.
Previous studies argued AP region airlines have been seen as generally
entering into few alliances with each other or with other airlines (Eleck et.
al., 1999; Graham, 1997, Hooper, 1997; Li, 1998; PC, 1998; Oum, 1998).
These arguments generally show a concern of the aviation sector in the AP
region in forming strategic alliances. This leads to a question of the impact
of market liberalization on formation of strategic airline alliances. As this
research has identified types and numbers of strategic airline alliances, it
enables further analysis of the impact of the liberalization on formation of
airline alliances, to contribute to air transport market liberalization debates.
The future prospect of airline strategic alliances is seen as increasing and
stable and the survival rates of airline alliances have been improving very
rapidly during the last decade, and this trend is likely to continue in the
future (Oum, Park & Zhang, 2000). This study further contributes to
analysis of the effects of strategic airline alliances in the future.
ENDNOTE
1. The Fifth Freedom Right of Air is the right of an airline from country A to carry
revenue between country B and other countries, C., D., etc. The Seventh Freedom Right of
Air is the right of an airline formed in one country to carry revenue traffic between two points
within another country.
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APPENDIX A
US OPEN SKIES POLICY
1. Open entry on all routes between the bilateral partners;
2. Unrestricted rights for partner airlines to operate between any
international gateways in the United States and participating
countries, including to intermediate and beyond points;
3. Unrestricted capacity, frequency and aircraft on all routes;
4. Flexibility for airlines in setting fares within certain guidelines;
5. Liberal charter and cargo arrangements;
6. The ability of carriers to convert earnings into hard currency and
return those earnings to their homelands without restriction;
7. Open code-sharing opportunities;
8. Rights for carriers to perform their own ground handling in the
partner country;
9. The ability of carriers to enter freely into commercial transactions
related to their flight operations; and
10. A commitment for non-discriminatory operation of, and access to,
computer reservation systems
Source: Airline Business, 1992; Subcommittee on Aviation 1997.
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APPENDIX B







Route specific alliance refers to the prime Bilateral
Air Service Agreement signed between two countries,
to enable flights between cities of the two countries,
or boost capacity or frequencies of flight service
between cities of the two countries (or may grant
beyond rights, to use intermediate stops or beyond
services). The bilateral agreement of six weekly
Singapore-New York services signed between
Singapore and USA enables three flights agreement
operated via Brussels and three via Frankfurt is an
example. A trading-beyond-right between Korea and
India enables Korean Airlines to fly from India to
Europe and Egypt, in return for the right to Air India




Code share refers to block space agreements, or code
share on a number of city-pair markets. These
agreements often involve one airline buying blocks of
seats on the other’s flights and reselling them: Qantas
and Air Nuigini operate a route-specific alliance,
which involves code sharing on flights between
Cairns and Port Moresby and Mount Hagen. An
agreement between United Airlines and Ansett
enables passengers to travel to Sydney on a United
Airlines flight and connect with Ansett flights to eight
Australian cities. Code share also involves one
airline’s designator code shown on flights operated by
its partner airline. Code sharing agreements allow
each airline involved to provide services with its
partner’s flights even though it does not operate the
aircraft itself. For example, Canadian Airlines and
Qantas had a code-sharing agreement on the
Vancouver- Honolulu- Sydney route where Canadian
served the Vancouver-Honolulu section and Qantas
served the Honolulu-Sydney section of the route.




Joint activities generally refer to joint venture,
collaboration or cooperation including joint
purchasing of aircraft and fuel. The joint operation is
within the areas of cooperation in joint use of ground
facilities, coordination in ground handling,




A marketing alliance involves cooperative agreements
on ticketing service, share of CRS, FFPs and joint
advertising, including milestones such as Star
Alliance. To this extent, a marketing alliance may
cover some of the joint activities, as the marketing
alliance can also involve joint use of ground facilities,
coordination in ground handling, coordination of
flight schedules and on-line and interline co-
operations under the agreement of global alliances.
Marketing alliances include oneworld, Star, Qualifier,
Air France/Delta Global Wings (Northwest/KLM),
and other similar regional based alliances.
TYPE 5
(Open Skies)
Open skies refers to the alliances initiated by the US
between some American, European Union and a few
Asian Pacific countries. The alliances, formed under
the US bilateral open skies policy, are basically
commercial alliances in nature, being more
integrative in levels and areas of cooperation,
compared with the other types of alliances. The
memorandum of understanding normally covers code
share agreements on international and domestic
flights, reciprocal FFPs, lounge access, though check-
in, integration of boarding procedures, computer
reservation system linkage, joint marketing and sales
programs. Open skies may involve a single aviation
market, free access to the markets, full traffic rights,
and may also grant anti-trust immunity. However, few
counties so far have been granted these rights (Also
see the open skies policy in Appendix A).
Sources: Airline Business, 1989-1999; General Accounting Office, 1995; IC, 1997, 1998;
ICAO, 1997; Park, 1997; Oum, Park, & Zhang , 2000
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BUTTON, K. & STOUGH, R. (2000). Air Transport Networks—Theory and
Policy Implications. Northamptom, MA: Edward Elgar. Pp. 377. ISBN 1-
84064-429-X. $95US, hardcover.
REVIEWED BY CHIEN-TSUNG LU, Omaha, Nebraska
Air transportation is one of the important transportation models
expanding its influence to the dynamics of global economy (Wells, 1999).
After the US airline deregulation in 1978, the dramatic increase of
domestic as well as international aviation services (e.g., passengers and
cargos), have shifted the complexity of the aviation system to a higher level
(Clougherty, 2000). To date, airlines are encountering more fiercely
competitive markets; and inevitably have to maintain a higher intra-
dependent network or alliance for lower operational cost (Brueckner &
Whalen, 2000) and seamless services (Staniland, 1996), which helps them
to better compete with business rivals and survive.
The major tasks of Button and Stough’s book Air Transport
Networks—Theory and Policy Implications are twofold: to interpret air
transportation related theories and to examine practical views. The authors,
Kenneth Button and Roger Stough, did not aim to examine the merits of
engineering development. In fact, they focused on the development of air
transportation service, airport infrastructure, network, air freight, and
safety issues in relation to policy development and mandates. Because air
transportation has contributed an essential section to global economy, this
book began with the analysis of airline economics and provided the
enthusiastic readers a general idea about the economic importance of air
industry.
Chapter two further outlined in detail the contribution of air
transportation to the traditional economy such as the interpretation of
demand and cost, the logic of pricing, and yield management. Yield
management, in particular yield revenue, was regarded as a critical
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dependent variable resulting from the combined calculation of several
independent variables such as determined fare, overbooking rate, flight
arrangement and fleet optimization. As the authors illustrated, airlines are
profit-seeking business. Therefore, yield management played a crucial role
in airline operation. Most importantly, because the perspective of airline
deregulation was that it could generate profits aplenty, new business rivals
wanted to entry. The increased amount of airlines had triggered business
competitions—price wars and route adjustment. Thus, in order to attract
more passengers, providing lower airfares was the prior tactic after
deregulation. In addition, cutting low-profit or no-profit routes was a
strategy to reduce operational cost. Although, from the investors’
standpoint, implementing price wars and reducing costs were rational, the
competing scenario inevitably initiated new policies from the government
in order to protect the air service for the public. In particular, those living in
remote communities should also share the advantage of air transportation.
In fact, two decades following the deregulation in 1978, the net profits of
airlines remained extremely low even though there was a dramatic
expansion of airline operation. From the perspective of airline operators,
strategic alliance has been a major feature to expand service, share facilities
and manpower, inter-exchange promotion, stimulate potential demands,
reduce operational cost, and ultimately increase net profits.
Air service is a type of network service now. Chapter three outlined the
importance of network as well as the introduction of various network
models. Via the economic analysis, the authors gave the audiences a big
picture regarding the relationship between the airline network and
operational cost. The domestic airline network of a specific country was
relatively small in relation to the global one. Thus, to mandate a domestic
regulation would involve a global correspondence. In the same vein,
changes in the format of airline networks cannot avoid the update of related
regulations such as the bilateral agreement of the Chicago Convention and
the pricing policy of International Air Transport Association (IATA).
Moreover, the policy change would not be limited to a singular operational
item, but would also contain the other essential factors such as taxation,
ownership, competition, licensing, product purchase, and research.
Chapter four demonstrated the concepts of quantitative data usage
because quantified information was an important resource for decision
making. As stated by the authors, quantitative analysis helped to locate the
operational gaps and weakness for government and the industry in order to
fix the deficits, to forecast future trends accurately, and to generate better
public goods. In other words, data collection should be reliable and
trustworthy in order to provide useful results and contribute appropriate ex
ante policy decisions and more efficient ex post policy executions.
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Chapter five demonstrated three case studies regarding the policy
change before and after airline deregulation in the U.S., Canada, and
European Union (EU). In the case of the U.S., the author began with
addressing aviation reform in the U.S. aviation history prior to 1978. These
historical narratives built a solid foundation for airline deregulation. The
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 focused on several major operational
areas such as the government’s release of regulated pricing, business entry
and exit, routes, and the air transportation service to remote community.
The short-term impact after deregulation showed a different outcome
instead of the predicted situations by policy makers. Instead of a predicted
expansion of air service in the late 1970s, the domestic market immediately
showed negative effects as illustrated by a shrunken domestic economy, the
development of ground transportation, low-fare airlines, and price
increases of fuels and wide-body aircraft. In the early 1980s, most airlines
still retained their belief as indicated by the dramatic increase of non-stop
flights. Therefore, additional capitals were invested to establish more new
entrants and consequently created intensive competitions among
counterparts. The airports were equally expanded due to the increase of
airlines. Yet by mid-1981, because of the increase of fuel price, the
expansion of large airlines, and hub airports, the industry saw only a short-
term effect and the substantial reduction of air service occurred later on.
Pricing strategy wars were another significant factor during the first few
years after deregulation; because discount fares were issued and resulted in
a dramatic profit reduction. Fortunately, the air transportation safety was
improved stemmed from the technology development.
The long term effect has resulted in the increase of commercial
operations due to the reduction of airfare and implementation of hub-and-
spoke logic. Specially stated by the authors, “fare remained lower in real
terms than under regulation” (p.100), but lower-fare strategy had also
moved the profit down to the marginal level regardless of passenger
expansion. The fierce competition created a playground for price wars but
also encouraged business mergers. In addition to the costs of fuels, parts,
and labors, the operational expenditures of an air carrier involved other
items. Yet they were traditionally ignored such as facility rents, noise
abasement costs, safety and risk management, and insurance fees. From the
standpoint of policy making, the need for a new policy or policy mandate
was mainly determined by the fact of whether “the burden of costs
outweighs the benefits generated” (p.109). Unfortunately, “airlines had
been overoptimistic in their claims about the service they could offer”
(p.109); and the cases of flight cancellations, delays, and customer
complaints were increased after deregulation.
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Under the bilateral agreement, airlines could expand and connect their
domestic flights to international routes based on hub-and-spoke system.
However, foreign carriers could not implement the same strategy because
this agreement was limited by the U.S. government. In Canada, aviation
liberalization was launched a decade after the deregulation in the U.S.
Based on the “Canadian gradualism” (p.129), which learned lessons from
the deregulation experiences in the US., the Canadian government
gradually phased their aviation reforms that augmented to allow more room
for the government and more time for the industry to react. Not until the
1980s did the deregulation in Canada occur. The Canadian airlines
provided more services in lieu of launching price wars under the fare
control from the government. The embracement of de facto flexibility in
the policy played a guiding role during this period. This de facto flexibility,
from time to time, loosened the barriers of pricing, competition, slot
acquisitions for incumbents. The Canadian airline mergers were inevitable
in the late 1980s for cost reduction, powerful market position, and higher
traffic density. Then hub-and-spoke system was adopted and combined
with the acquisitions of regional airlines by major Canadian carriers for a
better feeder service.
In EU, most flights are international within European continent.
Countries individually regulated their own aviation in order to protect
public interests. The separated airline regulations of individual countries
helped to protect the domestic benefit but simultaneously impeded airline
alliances. Yet, the barriers were partially removed by a series of legislative
activities—domestic reform, bilateral agreements, and Open Skies
agreement. Three legislative packages contributed policy mandates in
reducing airfare, expanding routes and flights, and ultimately enhancing
airline networking across European nations.
Chapter six further expanded these points and focused on the gap of the
aviation network. The authors also outlined the gradual development of
expanded airline liberalization and the trend of global multi-agreement
among airlines. In addition, the impact to environment, safety, and society
from multi-agreement was also discussed in terms of required policy
negotiation.
The next three chapters have an economic perspective. The authors
addressed the impact of the global transport network on airport
infrastructures and capacity, market stability, monopoly, and ownership.
This discussion helped the aviation audience, in particular, the business
investors, to thoroughly understand the economic impact related to market
liberalization. Market stability was a critical issue discussed and
empirically analyzed by the authors. As argued by Button and Stough,
“market liberalization has in general enhanced both the technical and
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dynamic efficiency of network industries” (p. 189). Yet, the logic of the
multi-agreement in association with liberalization complicated the policy
decision in relation to the global network implementation. Airport pricing
and infrastructure was no exception. Particularly in Europe, low-cost
entrants were an important stimulus in facility usage changing airport
policy.
Chapter ten specifically discussed the local economic issues
surrounding a hub city. This included the remodeling of a facility,
infrastructure expansion, manpower recruitment, navigation system
maintenance, taxation collection, and the nearby area’s economic
development. An accurate business forecasting could effectively predict a
guaranteed benefit and attract investors. A time series trend and
multivariate analysis were typically used to demonstrate the economic
scenarios centered at a hub city.
Chapter eleven and twelve dictated another important feature of the air
transportation—the relationship between airfreight and aviation network.
Air cargo increasingly relied on the aviation network due to the success of
liberalization, technological developments, and policy reforms. Air freight
offered a dynamic interaction, or a de facto dynamics, between shippers
and policy makers, between policy makers and liberalization, between
liberalization and airport infrastructure, and between airport infrastructure
and freight carriers. All of the aforementioned aviation actors, as stated by
the authors, “can combine to provide an integrated service to users, or they
can act as substitutes and compete for customer’s demands” (Button &
Stough, 2000, p. 309).
Chapter thirteen discussed safety and environmental issues under the
global alliance. Globalization has made policy making more difficult and
complex. To insure the commitment of safety enhancement and
environmental protection associated with liberalization and the global
alliance, policymaking was regarded critical upholding the proposed safety
equation advocated by Button and Stough. Safety related policies among
alliance airlines, such as security, passenger service, information
availability, management incentive, and lobby power, were primarily
discussed. The environmental impacts were also prescribed. Benefits
gained from aviation liberation and airline alliance should not outweigh the
other issues of air and noise pollution. Unfortunately, although policy
makers had a variety of policy instruments dealing with environmental
problems, the pursuit of a clean air transportation network were only
partially accomplished. Many environmental challenges are still facing
policy makers today.
Button and Stough offered a useful interpretation in light of the
relationship between airline activities and policy changes. In particular, the
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aforementioned three cases proposed by the authors pointed out some
important issues. This includes the following areas. The agreement of
airline networking should be a slow process. How to make the best usage of
airports, fleets, and infrastructure and simultaneously reduce price was and
should be always the core question associated with each negotiation across
time and location. The regulatory reform from the bilateral agreement
regarding the three cases possesses an important challenge to the aviation
industry as a global network. From the historical perspective, the authors
provided valuable summaries for the readers as they explore and learn
about aviation policy reforms. The authors gave a detailed explanation and
offered insights regarding the theoretical development of the aviation
network and associated policy reforms across time and countries. Technical
and economic analyses were especially well explained, which helped
readers to adopt genuine concepts affecting aviation liberalization,
alliances, and the network. Accordingly, the authors expressed their
expertise in a compelling fashion throughout the entire book.
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unsubstantiated criticism may be offensive to an author and generally fails to persuade a 
reader. Inflammatory remarks will not be accepted.
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Solicited Reviews
The maximum time allowed for completing a solicited review will be four weeks. If a reviewer 
is unable to meet this deadline, please inform the editor of a new date for completion or return 
the book so another reviewer can be contacted. For reviewers living outside the U.S.A., reviews 
may be returned via e-mail. 
Conflict of Interest
Reviews written by the book’s author(s), publisher, distributor, or by colleagues at the same 
institution or organization will not be considered. Also, duplicate reviews (previously 
published) will not be accepted. All authors of book reviews are required to include with their 
submission the following statement signed and dated. I, author’s name, do not have any 
commercial interest in the main topic of the book under review, nor am I associated with a 
company or other organization with commercial interest in the main topic of the book.
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In order to view the sample book review you will need Adobe Acrobat Reader. If you do 
not have a copy you may download if for free by clicking here.
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Manuscripts and Call for Papers
Authors wishing to submit original 
manuscripts for consideration should send 
two double-space paper copies and one 
electronic copy either via email at 
journal@unomaha.edu or on an IBM 
compatible three and one-half inch diskette 
to the following address:
Aviation Institute/JAT
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Format
All papers must be written in the English language. Use a 12 point font and allow for a 1"
margin on all sides. Double-space all material including quotations, the abstract, notes, and
references. All figures and tables should be on a separate page at the end of the text. Include the
figure name and filename on the bottom of the page. Please proofread all article submissions for
punctuation, spelling, and format errors.
The cover page should include the title of the manuscript, the author's name(s), shipping and email
addresses, telephone number, and a short biographical statement summarizing the author's
education and current affiliation. Please note the primary contact person. The second page should
contain an abstract of the manuscript. The abstract should include a concise description of the
contents of the paper, the research method used, and the results. Abstracts should generally be
kept to about 100 words.
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Figures and Tables
Figures and tables should appear at the end of the paper with each item on a separate page. Indicate 
in the text the approximate location where each figure and table should be placed. Figures, tables, 
and the text should each be saved as separate files. Do not embed tables and figures in the text files. 
Include the appropriate file name at the bottom of the page for each figure and table. Figures and 
tables must be camera-ready, printed in black ink only and must fit with in a 4 inch by 7 inch area.
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Reference Style
Due to the international participation, rigid referencing style criteria are not mandated. 
Acceptable reference styles of the author's country will apply. For the U.S.A., the most
recent edition of the American Psychological Association (APA) Manual of Style is preferred.
Ensure all references are cited and all citations are referenced.
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Review Process
A rigorous double-blind review will be conducted by the JAT  Panel of Reviewers. 
Additionally, a member of the Editorial board will conduct a third review. If revisions
are necessary, the editor will determine when a revised manuscript is in compliance with reviewer
recommendations. Authors must make revisions to original documents and resubmit them to
JAT on disk in Word or Word Perfect format. All revisions must be completed within two
weeks after return to the author. Manuscripts must be original, not previously published, nor under
consideration for another journal while undergoing review by the JAT.
Copyrights: Copyrights are retained by the authors and the JAT. Permission to duplicate and
distribute for educational purposes at no charge is granted.
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Additional Information
Additional information is available on the JAT web site at
http://jat.unomaha.edu or by contacting the JAT directly at 402-554-3424 or
journal@unomaha.edu
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